THREE ESSAYS ON THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY ON AGRICULTURAL INPUT MARKETS by Lei, Lei
  
 
THREE ESSAYS ON THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY ON 
AGRICULTURAL INPUT MARKETS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Lei Lei 
December 2017
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2017 Lei Lei 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
  
THREE ESSAYS ON THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY ON 
AGRICULTURAL INPUT MARKETS 
 
Lei Lei, Ph. D. 
Cornell University, 2017 
 
This dissertation provides a thorough analysis of the impact of international trade 
policy on agricultural input markets. International agricultural trade are often affected 
by policies in importing and exporting countries. These policies can be directly or 
indirectly imposed on the production inputs. It is important to understand the markets’ 
responses in both importing and exporting countries to the policies changes through 
vertical linkages between the input and output markets. This dissertation provides 
three essays to study this topic from the prospective of importer, exporter, input 
market, output market, and trade negotiation mechanism.  
 Essay 1 studies a European Union trade policy induced technological innovation, 
specifically on its impact on the U.S. apple markets. I adopt the Ex Ante approach to 
simulate the market reaction to both the European Union policy change and the 
technological innovation. The research finds that the policy induced technological 
innovation benefits the outputs that are intensive in the policy affected input. The 
methodology and conclusion contribute to research on markets with highly 
differentiated products. 
Essay 2 is motivated by the decade-long cotton dispute between Brazil and the 
United States. The dispute was arbitrated based on several domestic policies of the 
 United States. This chapter analyzes the impact of a U.S. domestic policy on 1) land 
re-allocation with a difference-in difference model; 2) international cotton trade 
between the United States and the rest of world including Brazil with a partial 
equilibrium simulation model. Based on the analysis, I find limited policy impact of 
removing this particularly U.S. domestic policy on international cotton trade. The 
result is consistent to the World Trade Organization arbitration of the dispute.  
Essay 3 summarizes three most common methods of quantifying the trade impact 
of non-tariff trade measures in the literature. I carefully compare the advantages and 
disadvantages between each method. A guidance of how to choose an appropriate 
method based on the characteristic of a non-tariff trade measure is summarized. To 
illustrate the guidance, I show a real example of apple trade with non-tariff trade 
measure imposed by the European Union. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation contains three essays on international agricultural trade. Following 
three chapters correspond to these essays respectively. Chapter 2 studies a trade policy 
that induced technological innovation in the exporter’s agricultural input market. It is 
about the exporters’ market response to importer’s policy change. Chapter 3 analyzes 
how a major exporter’s domestic policy on agricultural input could affect international 
trade of the output. It is about international trade’s responses to exporter’s policy 
change. Chapter 4 summarizes and discusses methods on quantifying non-tariff 
measures (created by trade policy) with an example. The three chapters collectively 
provide a thorough analysis of the impact of international trade policy on agricultural 
input markets, from the prospective of the importer, exporter, input market, output 
market, and trade negotiators.   
Chapter 2 “Effects of Trade Policy on Technological Innovation in Agricultural 
Markets” is motivated by a new European Union (EU) regulation change. The new 
regulation has lowered the residue level of a chemical that is commonly used in apple 
production. To continue exporting apples to the EU market, technological innovation 
was developed in apple production in the United States. This paper adopts the Ex Ante 
approach to stimulate potential U.S. market reaction to both the trade policy change as 
well as the technological innovation. The model is carefully designed to consider 1) 
the output substitution between different varieties of apple and 2) the vertical linkage 
between the input and output markets. The paper finds that the policy induced 
technological innovation (if effective) is beneficial, particularly to the product that is 
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initially negatively affected by the policy change. It also has the potential to lead to 
product quality upgrade in the long run. The model and conclusion from this paper can 
be generally applied to other markets with highly differentiated products. 
Chapter 3 “Has U.S. Agricultural Policy distorted International Trade? A Study on 
Planting Flexibility Impact on U.S. Exports” is motivated by the Brazil cotton case in 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiation. The U.S. has lost the cotton case to 
Brazil due to various domestic policies of the United States, including the planting 
flexibility which affects land use. This paper aims to identify and quantify the impact 
of this U.S. land use policy on its cotton exports. I first use county-level acreage data 
to estimate the impact of the planting flexibility policy on land relocation between 
grain crop (including cotton) and fruit and vegetable crops. I found the policy did 
increase the land use to produce grain crop (including cotton). With the econometric 
estimation from the first step, I then develop a simulation model of international grain 
trade to analyze the “indirect” impact of the U.S. land use policy on the world cotton 
market. The paper finds limited policy impact on trade flow though removing the 
policy could still yield positive total welfare for foreign producers and consumers. The 
results shed light not only on a country’s domestic policy making but also the WTO 
negotiation mechanism. 
Chapter 4 “Revisiting How Nontariff Measures are Quantified: Barriers Applied to 
Inputs in Markets with Differentiated Products” provides a mechanism on how to 
quantify a NTM in academic research or policy making, with a real example for 
demonstration at the end. Based on characteristics of various NTMs, a thorough 
analysis of prevailing NTM quantifying methods with examples from previous 
 3 
literature is done. Suggestions of how to choose a method based on research purpose 
are made for creating the mechanism. To demonstrate how to follow the mechanism, I 
quantified the impact of the EU lowering Maximal Residue Level on international 
apples trade.  
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CHAPTER 2. EFFECTS OF TRADE POLICY ON TECHNOLOGICAL 
INNOVATION IN AGRICULTURAL MARKETS 
2.1 Introduction  
The increasing global inter-dependency between countries has induced a new set of 
technological innovations due to food safety issues and environmental policies in 
international trade (Hayami and Ruttan 1971; Cavallo and Mundlak 1982; Coeymans 
and Mundlak 1993; Carletto, De Janvry, and Sadoulet 1996; Macnaghten 2016). 
Among them, some technological innovations have specifically reformed the 
agricultural industry (Sunding and Zilberman 2000; Schut et al. 2016). These policy 
induced technological innovations are sometimes in favor of certain final 
commodities, which are most affected by the policy. This paper studies the impact of 
policy induced biased technological innovation in the U.S. agricultural industry. 
Following a conceptual model on biased technology in differentiated products, the 
paper tests the impact of the biased technological innovation using a specific example 
for the U.S. apple industry. Suggestions are provided to policy makers and agricultural 
producers.  
Technological innovation has a significant impact on agricultural development 
(Schultz 1964; Cochrane 1979). Many technological innovations were induced by 
government policies and regulations (Sunding and Zilberman 2000). For example, the 
tomato harvester (biased towards labor input) was introduced following the end of the 
Bracero Program1 in 1960s. In recent years, the food safety regulation and 
environmental concerns have led to more intensive research and alternatives for the 
widespread use of chemicals in many stages of the production process. In agricultural 
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and food market, examples are the emergence of integrated farm management systems 
and various biotechnologies (Sunding and Zilberman 2000).  
Internationally, the food safety regulation and environmental policies made by 
international organizations and major trade destinations also induce biased 
technological innovation for countries to 1) fulfill global responsibility; 2) avoid any 
non-tariff barriers (NTBs) or meet Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) standards; 3) 
enjoy the favorable prices created by trade constraints. For example, because of the 
ozone-depleting effects, the use of methyl bromide in agricultural production was 
scheduled to be banned in the United States in 2005 under the Montreal Protocol. As a 
widely used fumigation in the agricultural sector, especially the strawberry industry, 
the economic impact of banning the methyl bromide can be significant and complex. 
Industry groups invested a lot in developing alternative fumigants. These alternatives 
are induced by the policy ban and biased towards the fumigant input (Carter et al. 
2005; Goodhue, Fennimore and Ajwa 2005). Much research studied the market 
response to the policy ban and to the adoption of alternatives (Braun and Supkoff 
1994; Duniway 2002; Byrd et al. 2005).  
This paper provides a general framework to study such innovations focusing on 
how the biased technology affects differentiated products in different ways, and 
studies a specific example of a food safety policy that induced technological 
innovation to avoid SPS barriers in international trade. It focuses on analyzing the 
potential economic impact of the biased technology incorporating product 
differentiation. The implication could shed light on the development of innovative 
technologies, public research and development (R&D) efforts in agricultural markets, 
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and the development of agricultural trade policies.   
2.1.1 Policy Background 
Because many member states in the EU have relatively high consumption of 
apples, the new policy will bring a significant impact on the global apple market, not 
only to the EU member states, but also the third countries and food business operators. 
The strictness of the new MRLs not only rules out the DPA treated products but also 
any cross-contaminated products in the process of storage, packing and shipping. In 
general, it will be difficult for any industry that has not operated in a DPA-free 
environment for the last few years to meet the new requirements (USAEC 2013). 
Concerns have been expressed from world major apple producers including Chile, 
South Africa and the United States. The new MRL set by the EU is more like a ban of 
DPA on apples in most cases. 
The EU has been an important market for U.S. apple exports. The U.S. apple 
exports to the EU has maintained a steady upward trend since 1990. The share of total 
exports to the EU has been around 7% and it experienced a slight increase since 2004. 
The increasing trend has been steady (Figure 2.1). The largest import markets within 
the EU are the United Kingdom (UK). The UK has been one of the top six U.S. apple 
exporting destinations, accounting for about 69% of the total U.S. apple exports in the 
past three decades (USITC ITS 2010). Although there is the Brexit (still in 
negotiation) going on, there are other important markets in the EU for the U.S. apples, 
such as Finland, Netherland, Spain, Sweden, and so on. 
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Source: FAOSTAT 
Figure 2.1. U.S. fresh apple exports 
There were no SPS barriers for U.S. apples entering the EU before 2013. There 
could be a 50% or more decrease of the Washington apple exports to Europe with this 
new regulation (Karst 2013). The east coast, one of the apple major production 
regions, also faces challenges. Complaints have been raised from various stakeholders 
in the apple industry. However, although it is risky to export apples to Europe, most 
apple industry participants would be reluctant to give up the European market. It will 
depress the U.S. domestic apple market if the extra supply of apples are going to be 
absorbed domestically. Furthermore, exploring new export destinations could also be 
very expensive. In addition, the new MRL regulation of the EU has aroused attention 
from other countries on the use of DPA for apples. Similar discussions on reducing 
DPA on apples have been going on in other countries (Gillam 2014). Therefore, 
implementing brand new equipment, packing lines and storage rooms may be a sound 
investment in the long run. When a change in trade rules seems permanent, it may lead 
to a complete overhaul of the infrastructure, and that may enable adoption of new 
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technology and modernization of agricultural practices (Sunding and Zilberman 2001). 
While increasing costs to producers, the overhaul also brings benefits. The actual 
effect on producer welfare can be very complex. It may differ depending on location, 
time, and degree of product differentiation. In this paper, I am going to study the 
economic impact of the EU policy change on the highly differentiated apple market of 
the United States with a focus on welfare measurements. 
2.1.2 Producer Response to Input Ban in Agricultural Markets 
Due to environmental and food safety concerns, there have been bans and other 
policy changes in the agricultural industry. Much research has been done to study the 
induced technological or non-technological alternatives to the banned substance or for 
becoming compliant to the new standards. Pesticide bans provide a strong incentive 
for the development of alternatives at the manufacturer level and for the adoption of 
alternative strategies including nonchemical treatment, biological control, etc. 
Examples include the elimination of dibromochloropropane that enhanced the 
adoption of drip irrigation that enabled applications of alternatives (Sunding and 
Zimmerman 2001). Banning methyl bromide on nursery plants induced both chemical 
and non-chemical innovations to replace it (Braun and Supkoff 1994; Duniway 2002; 
Byrd et al. 2005; Carter et al. 2005; Goodhue, Fennimore and Ajwa 2005). These 
papers show that because of the technology induced by policy, producers benefited 
and were rewarded from adopting the induced technology in the long run. However 
the short run investment and cost brought a welfare loss at the beginning. At the 
macro- level, the policy impact together with biased technology even affected 
agricultural trade patterns and production levels for certain regions (Lynch, Malcolm 
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and Zilberman 2005).  
In the DPA apple case, there is no perfect chemical alternative for DPA currently. 
The only feasible way for apple producers to meet the MRL set by the EU is through 
farm management. This includes expediting or postponing harvest, shorten postharvest 
period, enhancing sorting, packaging, transport and other stages in the postharvest 
stage (McPhee 1999). 
With public R&D supported by the U.S. government, a recently developed 
biomarker technology may prove to be a solution due to its easy accessibility, cost-
savings and effectiveness to solve the apple postharvest storage problems. This 
metabolic and genetic biomarker could predict, diagnose, and distinguish the potential 
development of the postharvest disorders and allow marketers to release the products 
before the disorders evolve too far. It ensures that high quality, and disorder-free 
products remain available across the supply chain. The biomarker technology is shown 
to be an effective alternative of DPA through various ways. It will bring a shift from 
treatment type apple storage to more economically feasible, sustainable, and 
management-based systems. In particular, the bio-marker favors the high value 
products - the highly susceptible apples, by enhancing the yield. To better evaluate the 
economics of biomarker on high value and low value commodities, the paper 
simulates the likely impact of biomarker use on prices and quantities of apples at the 
retail and farm levels, and on the welfare of producers and consumers. 
2.1.3 Conceptual Model 
Biased technological innovation has been playing a significant role in social 
development and economic growth. Labor saving, capital saving and neutral 
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technological progresses all lead to economic growth in different ways (Ruttan and 
Hayami 1984; Ruttan and Hayami 1984; Lucas 1988; Helpman 1998; Card and 
DiNardo 2002). Previous research on biased technology focused on studying the 
relative factor prices, factor proportions in production, equilibrium analysis of the 
technology adoption and economic growth (Kennedy 1964; Romer 1990; Acemoglu 
2007). These papers studied the biased technological innovation from the producer’s 
perspective on adopting such technology to minimize cost and enhance firms’ ability 
to maximize profit. However, most of this work focused on the biased technology 
impact directly on factors, rather than the impact on output being produced using the 
technologically innovated biased factors. In this paper, changes are developed based 
on the classical framework of biased-technological innovation to analyze how biased-
technological innovation favors different outputs in industries with highly 
differentiated commodities. These commodities require different amounts of factors in 
production. Therefore, they are affected by the biased-technological innovation in 
different ways. The biased technological innovation favors certain commodities 
through the factors it is biased towards. 
The model is set up following the basic set up of a producer profit maximization 
problem. Consider a producer produces two products 1y and 2y , using two factors 1x  
and 2x . Then 1y and 2y are two different types of products of the same commodity 
(imperfect substitution of each other). They are differentiated by some characteristics 
of the commodity. Factor ratios are fixed but different in the production of 1y and 2y . 
Producing both products requires two common factors 1x and 2x . Product 1y  is 
 11 
relatively more intense in factor 1x than product 2y . In another words, producing one 
unit of product 1y requires more 1x than producing the same amount of product 2y . In 
our case, suppose a technological innovation biased towards factor 1x , is being adopted 
by the producer to use in the production of both 1y and 2y . Consider the objective 
function of a profit maximizing producer that operates in a competitive goods market, 
facing given factor and goods prices as following:  
1 2 1 2
1 2 2 1 2 1 2
1 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
1 1 2 1 2,
max    [ ( , ) ] [ ( , ) ]
x x
P g x x w x w x P g x x w x w xπ π π= + = − − + − −  
Where the superscript indicates output and the subscript is for input; P is the output 
price. Products 1y and 2y have different prices and they are not perfect substitutes of 
each other; g is the production function of the output commodities for both products. It 
is a real-valued function and twice continuously differentiable (first derivative with 
respect to 1x is monotonic increasing evaluating at 1x ). Products 1y and 2y are produced 
following the same production, but product 1y is 1x intensive relative to product 2y in 
production. In addition, 1w and 2w are the prices of the two factors 1x and 2x respectively. 
The technological innovation enters the profit maximization problem by affecting the 
production function g .  
For a biased technology that is 1x augmenting, it favors the production of 
commodity 1y which is relatively 1x intensive in production. Adopting the technology 
leads to an increased cost because the factor price of 1x increases from 1w to 1
tw . With 
the new technology, the producer who only produces product 1y will increase his/her 
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profit 1π . This can be seen from the first order condition. With the technology, the 
marginal product of factor 1x increases while the factor price of 1x also increases to 1
tw . 
For the biased technology favored commodity 1y , 1
1 1 1
1 2 1( *, *)
t
xP g x x w> . The producer 
could increase its profits 1π by increasing the amount of 1x that it uses. The marginal 
unit of 1x contributes 1
1 1 1
1 2( *, *)xP g x x to revenue, while it costs the producer only 1
tw . 
Hence, using a little bit more 1x in production would generate more revenue than the 
associated cost. This is a net addition to profit. The producer will continue to do this 
until the first order condition holds with equality again. This process is shown in 
Figure 2.2a. With the biased technology, the initial equilibrium point for profit 
maximization ( 1 11 2*, *x x ) moves to (
1 1
1 2* ', * 'x x ) as the new tangent point of the new 
iso-cost and iso-quant line. The slope of the iso-cost line changed due to increased 
factor price of 1
tw . The new iso-quant line which is not parallel to the original one is 
because of the 1x  augmenting technology which means the marginal product of 1x  
increases faster than the marginal product of 2x . In the new equilibrium, the producer 
increases its use of 1x and produce more 1y  for higher profit. 
On the other hand, with the technology biased towards factor 1x , the producer who 
only produces 2y will gain less or even experience a drop in profit 2π . This is because 
as the quality and productivity of product 1y improves with the new technology, its 
price will increase and the price of product 2y will decrease assuming there are only 
two products for the same commodity. Meanwhile, given the property of the 
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production function
1 1
2 2 1 1
1 2 1 2( *, *) ( *, *)x xg x x g x x< , and depending on the value of 1
tw , it 
is possible that product 2y has the first order condition as 1
2 2 2
1 2 1( *, *)
t
xP g x x w< . That is 
the value of marginal product of 1x is less than its market price. The producer profit 
2π  decreases because the addition to revenue of one more unit of 1x  is less than the 
marginal cost of using one more unit of 1x . This process is shown in Figure 2.2b. With 
the biased technology, the initial equilibrium point for profit maximization ( 2 21 2*, *x x ) 
moves to ( 2 21 2* ', * 'x x ) as the new tangent point of the new iso-cost and iso-quant line.  
The producer keeps producing to reach the new profit maximization where the use of 
1x is actually reduced. Even if this profit 2π decreasing case is not happening initially, 
it will later. Because product 1y  is making increasing profits, more resources will 
move to produce 1y from 2y . Gradually the producer who only produces 2y will have a 
reduction in profit. 
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Figure 2.2. Profit maximization of products y1 and y2 
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It is better for producers to include both products into their production to balance 
the risks brought from the technology adoption. Whether producers who produce both 
products will benefit from the biased technological innovation depends on the share of 
1y and 2y  in their production set. Based on above conceptual model, the paper 
proposes the following hypothesis: 
H0: technological innovation biases towards a certain factor favors the product 
in which the factor is intensive. Meanwhile it could lower the production 
of the product which is less intensive in the biased factor.  
The paper will test this hypothesis using a simulation analysis in the following section. 
To avoid potential profit loss brought by the adoption of the new technology, 
producers could diversify their production bundle, producing both commodities to 
balance the increase and decrease of profits.  
A simulation model is developed to test the hypothesis using data describing the 
U.S. apple industry. There are two factors in apple production: marketing and farm. 
Storage input is counted as a part of the farm factor. So the technological innovation, 
the biomarker, is biased to the marketing factor in apple production. As a highly 
differentiated commodity, I differentiate apples by their susceptibility to post-harvest 
disorders. Those highly susceptible apples are usually high-valued ones with higher 
market prices. The non-susceptible apples are relatively less-valued (Washington 
Grower House 2012). Therefore, in the apple industry, the biomarker favors the high-
valued apples. It will increase high-valued apple producers’ profits and welfare; while 
the bio-marker will have smaller impact for less-valued apples and their producers. To 
avoid the loss of adopting the biomarker, apple producers could consider to produce 
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both high-valued and less-valued apples. This paper develops an equilibrium 
displacement model of the apple industry to simulate the impact of the biased 
technology impact on different stakeholders of the industry, and in particular the 
producers of different apple varieties. 
2.2 Modeling the Apple Industry 
Since the biomarker technology is still in the testing stage, an Ex Ante approach is 
adopted following the frameworks typically used by agricultural economists to 
analyze new technologies. Because of the highly differentiated characteristics across 
products in the apple market, the paper explicitly takes into account the 1) 
interrelationships between input usage in different output markets; 2) 
interrelationships between categories of apples defined according to variety and grade; 
3) interrelationships between domestic demand and export demand of apples; 4) 
exogenous policy shifts in the input markets, technology adoption that causes shifts in 
input markets and the long-run consumer demand shift in the output market.   
To better study the impact of the policy induced technological innovation that are 
biased to certain policy treated factor or commodities in the agricultural sector, special 
attention is required to the degree of product differentiation in agriculture. “Over the 
years, product differentiation in agriculture has increased along with an increase in the 
importance of factors beyond the farm gate and within specialized agribusiness” 
(Sunding and Zilberman 2000). This evolution is affecting the nature and analysis of 
agricultural research. When a policy induced biased technology enters the economy, it 
is important to study how the vertical market structure of agriculture and how farm-
level innovation may contribute to changes in both the downstream and upstream 
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sectors (Alston, Sexton and Zhang 1997; Hamilton and Sunding 1998).  
The model is based on previous simulation studies that evaluate the impact of 
biotechnologies adopted in agricultural markets (Binswanger 1974; Heuth and Just 
1987; Lemieux and Wohlgenant 1989) and extended to incorporate biased 
technological impact in a multi-input and multi-output model. Here exogenous shocks 
are imposed considering the vertical linkage of the multi-input and multi-output 
markets. The linear elasticity model has good compatibility with parameter values 
selected through econometric or programming approaches. In addition to the major 
empirical contribution in policy making and technological innovation in the 
agricultural industry, the analysis of the paper could be generally applied to other 
markets with highly differentiated products.  
As a popular commodity that is consumed widely, there are about twenty major 
varieties of apples planted in the United States. There are many stakeholders in the 
commercial apple industry, from apple orchard through storage carrier, packing 
facilitator, wholesale, and retailer to international market. This model simplifies the 
apple market as shown in Figure 2.3. Since the focus of this paper is to study the EU-
U.S. apple trade subject to the EU SPS regulation, in the output market, representative 
varieties of apples are selected as: 1) varieties exported to the EU market (Empire, 
Gala, Honey Crisp and Granny Smith); 2) varieties that suffer most from postharvest 
disorders (Honey Crisp, Granny Smith, and Empire). So among the four varieties of 
apple exported from the United States to the EU, three of them are the highly 
susceptible ones: Empire (browning, external CO2 injury), Honey Crisp (soft scald) 
and Granny Smith (superficial scald). The non-susceptible variety is Gala. The 
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Empire, Honey Crisp and Granny Smith apples are higher value apples sold at higher 
prices in the market while the Gala apple is relatively less expensive. Therefore, the 
former group is considered as high value (H) type and the latter as the low value (L) 
type.  
 
Figure 2.3. Apple market structure 
In addition to variety classification, apples sold in the market are always 
categorized based on grade. Apple grades classify apples according to size, shape, 
color and overall quality. Higher grade (E) apples are sold as fresh fruit while the culls 
(C) are mainly being processed to make juice, jam and apple sauce. Combining the 
two classifications, the paper in total studies four types of apple output: higher value 
high grade (HE), higher value culls (HC), lower value low grade (LE), and lower 
value culls (LC). The high value and low value classification of apples could directly 
capture the biased impact of the biomarker which biases towards storage as an input. 
Further grade classification aims to explicitly study the policy and induced technology 
impacts. Higher grade apples are exported and directly being affected by the EU SPS 
Farm(F)
Storage
• High Value (H)
• Low Value (L)
Marketing(M)
• High Grade (E)
• Culls (C)
Output Markets
• High Value High Grade (HE)
• High Value Culls (HC)
• Low Value High Grade (LE)
• Low Value Culls (LC)
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regulation while the culls (C) apple are not much affected by the policy. In addition, 
the induced biased technological innovation – biomarker could “upgrade” culls to 
higher quality (E) apples. The detailed classification of apples is used to capture 
product-level details and substitution effects in the apple market.  
The model includes two inputs: the farm input and the marketing input. Storage of 
apple is counted as a major component of the farm input. So apple varieties determine 
the farm input required. So, there are farm inputs used for higher value apples (FH) 
and farm input used for lower value apples (FL); apple grades determines how much 
marketing input needed. There are marketing inputs used for higher grade apple (ME) 
and marketing inputs for culls (MC). In general, higher grade apples require less 
marketing input than culls (Stewart et al. 2011). With the fixed factor proportion 
assumption, for a given grade the higher value apples use more farm input (which 
includes storage) per unit than lower value apples: FH>FL; for a given variety, higher 
grade apples use less marketing input than culls: ME<MC.  
Overall the simulation model is developed and used to assess the impact of 
exogenous policy shocks and technological innovation shocks in the highly 
differentiated U.S. apple market in an open economy. A set of basic equations is used 
to describe demand, export demand, supply and the corresponding factor markets. 
This equilibrium displacement model includes markets for four outputs and two 
factors. It is a simplification of the U.S. apple market, but it does capture the critical 
characteristics found in the industry and provide a useful framework to examine the 
impact of policy change and biased technological innovation. The model is displayed 
as following:  
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(1) ( , )i i iQD f P A=  
(2) ( , )i i iQX g P AX=   
(3) i i iQS QD QX= +   
(4) ( )i iP MC W=   
1
( ,1)(5)
iN
il
l
i l
c WXD QS
W=
∂
=
∂∑   
(6) ( , )l l l lXS h W B=   
(7) l lXD XS=   
Apple output is denoted by superscript i. Input is denoted by subscript l. In the 
output retail/wholesale market, Variable QD is the domestic apple demand and there is 
an exogenous demand shift A in the output market. Variable QX is the apple exported 
abroad (international/ specific country apple demand) subject to an exogenous shift 
AX. Variable P is the apple price vector which assumes domestic price equals the 
world price. Variable QS is the apple supply. As for the two input markets, XS  
represents the input supply and XD is the derived input demand (output constant input 
demand function). The factor prices of farm input and marketing input are denoted by
W . The adoption of new technology biomarker will bring exogenous shift on the input 
supply represented by B . In equation (4) and (5), MC is the marginal cost function and
( ,1)i lc W denotes the unit cost function.  
Equation (1) and (2) are the domestic demand and export demand of output apple i. 
Equation (3) shows the apple output market clearing condition. Apple i 
retail/wholesale price equals marginal cost of producing it, equation (4) shows the 
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competitive equilibrium, the price linkage between output and input market. Equation 
(5) is the derived demand function of input l. The summation of ilXD  across all the 
varieties of apples, generates the total demand of input l which indicates the input 
market equilibrium. Equation (6) is the supply of input l. The last equation (7) is the 
input market clearing condition. 
For simulation, total differentiating the above model yields following equations 
(1’) to equation (7’). Equilibrium adjustments can be simulated by exogenously 
specifying changes in the shift parameters. In the following equations, for any variable 
V, notation E(V) represents dV
V
 where d is the total differential.  
1
(1') EQD EP
N
i ij j i
j
η α
=
= +∑  
1
(2 ') EQX EP
N
i ij j i
j
x xη α
=
= +∑   
(3') EQ EQD (1 )EQXi i i i iS S S= + −   
1
(4 ') EP EW
M
i i
l l
l
γ
=
=∑   
1 1
(5 ') EXD ( EW EQS )
N M
i i i i
l l k lk k
i k
λ γ σ
= =
= +∑ ∑   
(6 ') EXS EWl l l lε β= +     
(7 ') EXD EXSl l=   
The notation for the shares and elasticities parameter values used in the simulation are 
reported in Table 2.1. Detailed definition of the parameters in the model is provided in 
the following section.  
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Table 2.1. Parameter Specifications 
Symbol Definitions Formula Source 
ijη  Apple i domestic 
elasticity of demand 
with respect to the 
price of apple j 
i
j
j
i
ij
QD
P
P
QD
⋅
∂
∂
=η  
Armington Specification 
with random drawn  key 
parameters from prior 
distribution  
ijxη  Apple i export 
elasticity of demand 
with respect to the 
price of apple j 
i
j
j
i
ij
QX
P
P
QXx ⋅
∂
∂
=η  
Armington Specification 
with random drawn  key 
parameters from prior 
distribution 
iS  Domestic consumption 
share of US apple 
production 
- Calculated with industry 
data 
i
lγ  Cost share of input l in 
the production of 
apple i 
ii
lli
l QP
XW
=γ  
Calculated with industry 
data 
i
lλ  Industry share of input 
l used in the 
production of apple i l
i
li
l X
X
=λ  
Literature and industry 
estimation 
i
lkσ  Allen elasticity of 
substitution between 
input land k kl
i
lk MRTSd
kld
ln
)ln(
=σ 1 Assumption 
lε  Supply elasticity of 
input l 
l
l
l
lll
l X
W
W
BWh
⋅
∂
∂
=
),(
ε  
Random draw based on 
prior distribution 
iα  Percentage change in 
consumer demand for 
apple i from adoption 
of bio-marker 
i
i
i
i
i
i EA
QD
A
A
QD
∂
∂
=α
 
Calculated based on 
industry information 
lβ  Percentage change in 
costs due to adoption 
of bio-marker 
l
l
l
l
l
l EBX
B
B
h
∂
∂
=β  
Calculated based on 
industry information 
1MRTSkl is the marginal rate of technical substitution which equals the ratio between marginal 
product of input k and input l 
 
2.2.1 Data and Parameters 
Apple data from industry Washington Grower Clearing house, 2011-20123 are used 
in the model simulation4. All prices are weighted average monthly price at the “Free 
On Board” shipping point, based on price information received from the Washington 
apple growers and marketing firms in the area, taking consideration of sales price 
adjustment. A calculation is made to get the annual price, and a similar calculation is 
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applied for the apple quantities in the two seasons. All the quantities are measured in 
“Cargo” which contains one thousand 40lb cartons. As mentioned before, three 
varieties, Empire, Honey Crisp and Granny Smith are selected for the high value (H) 
apples. The price and quantity data of the high value apples are calculated and 
weighted by the market share of each variety. For apple grade, Extra Fancy and Fancy 
(including U.S. Number 1) apple are the higher grade (E). There are no data of culls 
(C) available directly. Therefore, I use an average packout rate5 of 85% from the 
industry to calculate the culls quantity based on the data of higher grade apples. Table 
2.2 shows the data used in the model. It lists the quantity and price data of the four 
outputs and two inputs used in each output production.  
Table 2.2. Apple and Factor Prices and Quantities 
Apple Quantity  Price 
 1000 CTNS $/CTNS 
High Value High Grade (HE) 412.08 35.14 
High Value Culls (HC) 61.81  0.16 
Low Value High Grade (LE) 1556.75 18.07 
Low Value Culls (LC) 242.78  0.16 
Marketing   
High Grade (ME) 1968.83 21.28 
Culls (MC) 304.60 0.128 
Farm   
High Value (FH) 1799.53 3.51 
Low Value (FL) 473.89 1.81 
Note: 1 CNTS (box)=40lb; 1 Car=1,000 CNTS  
Source: Author's calculation based on Washington Grower Clearing house  
 
With the apple price and quantity data at the retail/wholesale market level, the input 
price and quantity data are calculated based on the fixed factor proportion assumption. 
Summing apple outputs by varieties is done to distribute the total farm inputs, which 
only varies by varieties. Similarly, summing apple outputs by grade is done to 
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distribute the marketing input, which only varies by grade. Based on the model setting 
up, the key parameters in evaluating the economic impact of the biomarker are 1) 
elasticities of supply, demand, and export demand 2) cost and industry share 3) shock 
from the policy on the output demand side and shock from adopting the new 
technology on the factor supply side.  
For parameters in (1), I first obtained baseline values of these parameters from the 
relevant literature. Then following Davis and Espinoza (1998, 2000), Griffiths and 
Zhao (2000), Zhao et al. (2000), and Rickard and Lei (2011), I apply prior 
distributions to these parameters for a sensitivity analysis. I set the baseline parameter 
as the central tendency and specify a variance of 0.04 to develop beta (3,3) 
distributions (Brester, Marsh and Atwood 2004). The beta distribution is ideal for 
generating elasticity parameters due to its unique property such as continuous, 
symmetrical when parameters are equal, and is equivalent to uniform distribution 
when parameters equal to 1. It is often used to model events that are constrained to 
take place within an interval defined by a minimum and maximum value. The beta 
distribution selected here constrains demand elasticities to be negative and supply 
elasticity to be positive. Iterated by 1,000 times, random values are drawn for the 
parameters to generate empirical distribution results.  
Following previous estimates on the supply elasticity from the literature (Nerlove 
and Addison 1958; Gardner 1979), I set the baseline supply elasticity parameter for 
apples to equal to 0.5, expecting the supply of fruit is relatively inelastic. Since the 
apples are perennial crops, all cross-price elasticities of supply are set to equal to zero 
(Rickard and Lei 2011).  
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The domestic matrices of own- and cross-price elasticities of apple demand iiη  
and ijη are calculated following the Armington specification (Armington 1969).  
(8)      - (1- )    ii i iη ς η ς σ=  
(9)      ( )ij jη ς η σ= +   
The Armington specification is typically used for calculating the elasticity of 
differentiated commodities. It extends the homogeneous goods model to examine the 
demand response for differentiated goods (Rickard and Lei 2011). Here it is used to 
define the matrix of own- and cross-price elasticities of demand of apples 
differentiated by both varieties and grades. In equation (8) and (9), the overall demand 
elasticityη and the elasticity of substitution across the four different apple typesσ are 
set equal to baseline values from the literature. The baseline value of the overall 
demand elasticityη is based on the demand elasticity of the top eight apple varieties6 
estimated by Richard and Patterson (2000). I have averaged them weighted by market 
share of these varieties of apple. The value is is -0.762. The baseline value of the 
substitution across apples σ is set to equal to 1 following a range estimates used in 
the agricultural economic literature (Alston, Gray and Sumner 1994; Rickard and Lei 
2011) studying the substitution between fruit products has not been directly estimated 
and is not available in the literature. Simulation results are relatively independent to 
the baseline elasticity of substitution and I find that the results are robust across a 
range of plausible values.  
Several studies (Alston, Gray and Sumner 1994) discussed the limitation of the 
Armington specification. However based on specific differentiation of apples in the 
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paper and the data availability, the Armington specification is an appropriate method 
to generate the matrices of elasticities here. As for the export demand elasticity, the 
same method is applied. The only difference is the overall demand elasticity in the 
export case is set to -1.5, more elastic than the domestic estimation case based on 
estimates by the U.S. International Trade Commission (2010). On average (between 
2004 and 2008), about 8% to 16% of U.S. apple production was exported. Simulation 
results are robust to the value chosen for the demand elasticity within the range of -1.0 
to -2.5.  
Parameters in (2) are shares calculated on quantity data and using some 
assumptions. The share of consumption S is from USITC apple export studies (2010), 
using data in Table 2.2 and following assumptions and common knowledge supplied 
by stakeholders in the apple industry (Washington Grower House 2012; Reed, Elitzak 
and Wohlgenant 2002). The cost share of input ilγ  is calculated following the “20% 
and 80%” rule (Stewart et al. 2011) for each dollar invested in apple production, 80 
cents are used for marketing and 20 cents are used for farm production. For the 
industry share ilλ , I assume that the higher grade of apple usually needs less 
marketing than lower ones. Higher grade apples require a smaller share for marketing 
but more the farm share, 0.65:0.35. The culls are 0.85:0.15. The Allen elasticity of 
substitution ilkσ  is assumed to be 0 across different inputs based on the fixed factor 
proportion assumption and 1 as for the same input (Sumner, Lee and Hallstrom 1999; 
Rickard and Lei 2011).  
Parameters in (3) represent the exogenous shocks. The parameter iα  describes the 
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EU SPS regulation change and is used to introduce the effect of the policy shock in the 
simulation model. Given that the new SPS regulation was just implemented on March 
2nd 2014, no accurate data is available to estimate this parameter. About 23% of the 
U.S. apple exports go to the European market (USITC 2010). With the new SPS 
regulation, the two major apple growing and exporting states in the United States, 
Washington State and New York State, have exports that are expected to drop largely. 
About 8% to16% of U.S. apple production is exported between 2004 and 2008 
(USITC 2010); taking the maximum at 16%, there will be about 5% drop in apple 
demand by calculation. Because the higher value apples are susceptible to postharvest 
disorders and higher grade apples are being exported to the EU, the high value and 
high grade apple will be the most affected by the policy shock, I assume that the same 
shock will also affect the export demand for U.S. apples.  
The parameter iβ  which describes technological change as an exogenous variable 
is used to introduce shocks brought by the biased technological innovation in the 
simulation model. The biomarker increases marginal product of the farm input. On the 
other hand, there is a cost for apple producers to buy the biomarker. So the difference 
between them will be the net shock applied to the farm input. Due to limited data 
availability and complexity of the impact, assumptions and some approximations are 
made in the calculation. The main benefit of biomarker could bring to apple 
production is that: using biomarker could “upgrade” low grade apple to high grade, i.e. 
from culls to high value apples. Given the packout is 85%, assuming 50% of culls can 
be upgraded into high grade apples after applying the biomarker in postharvest stage7. 
The new pack out will become 92.5%. There is a 7.5% improvement in packout as a 
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benefit with adoption of the biomarker. On the cost side, the biomarker hasn’t been 
priced yet. Data are required to understand consumer’s willingness to pay in order to 
determine the price. For now, based on information provided by the biomarker 
developer, the production cost is quite low. I assume adopting the biomarker will only 
increase the farm input cost by 2.5%. Therefore, the net benefit brought by adopting 
the technological innovation, is 5% to the farm input used for the higher value apples.  
2.2.2 Measuring Welfare 
Simulated changes are reported for prices and quantities from the EU policy 
change. Changes in the welfare accruing to consumers and producers are measured 
using information about initial product prices and quantities, and the simulated 
changes in product prices and quantities. To get a mean prediction of the changes in 
surplus measures, 1,000 iterations are repeated in the simulation model. Each iteration 
draws values for elasticity parameters from empirical distributions that rely on 
estimates in the literature while the initial prices and quantities remain the same across 
all the iterations. Because the welfare calculated is based on a range of elasticities with 
fixed prices and quantities, the welfare results are also generated as distributions. 
Studying the welfare results provides a better understanding of the impact of the 
technological change. 
The following equations are used to calculate the welfare accruing to consumers of 
product i and to producers from factor l. Changes in the market due to the policy or 
technological innovation are reflected by the variable EP, EQD, EW, and EXS. 
Therefore the following equations capture the changes in welfare: 
i i i i iΔCS =-P QD EP [1+0.5EQD ]       (10)   
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l l l l lΔPS =W XS EW [1+0.5EXS ]        (11)  
The initial price and quantity of apple i and initial price and quantity of factor l are 
shown in Table 2.2. The factor quantities are calculated based on output quantities 
following the fixed factor assumption and each value is weighted by market shares of 
different apples. The factor prices are calculated according to the “20% and 80%” rule 
based on output prices and also being weighted on market shares. 
2.3 Results and Discussion 
I report results for the following four simulations:  
1. A 5% decrease in export demand of high value high grade apple due to 
EU SPS regulation change, but no change to other apples; 
2. A 5% increase in farm input for high value apple because of the biased 
new technology, but no changes to other apple; 
3. Simulation 1 and 2 simultaneously; 
4. In the long run with consumer recognition of the biomarker treated 
apples, a 15% increase in both domestic and export demand for high value 
high grade apples in conjunction with simulation 2. 
The purpose of simulation 1 is to capture the EU SPS impact on the U.S. apple market. 
The 5% exogenous shock is applied to high value high grade apple, because this type 
of apple is the product affected by the change of it. It is highly susceptible to 
postharvest disorders. Using DPA is a must in its storage. In addition, the high grade 
fresh apples are mainly exported to the European market (USITC 2010). Simulation 2 
is the case that the new technology, biomarker is being adopted8. Therefore, the 5% 
net benefit brought by the biomarker is imposed on the farm input, specifically on 
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farm input used for high grade apples. Because the 5% net benefit brought by 
biomarker is mainly from culls that are upgraded to high grade apples.  
Simulation 3 is aimed to compare the policy impact and technology impact to see 
the effectiveness of the biomarker technology. Can it be an effective alternative 
method to avoid using DPA so that U.S. apples can be compliant to the new MRL set 
up by the EU? Will it be able to mitigate some policy impact on the U.S. apple 
market? If so, by how much? Simulation 4 shows the long run result. Assuming the 
biomarker is an effective alternative of the DPA, there is no policy shock to the U.S. 
market any more. Given the function of the biomarker, in the long run, it is expected 
to be well accepted by the consumers since the treated apples will not suffer 
postharvest disorders (flesh browning, superficial scald etc.). There will be a demand 
increase of these good quality apples from consumers. In addition, lower grade apples 
are also expected to experience a quality upgrade with biomarker, the consumer 
demand of these types of apples may also change. So will the supply of different types 
of apples change. Given the share of high grade apples of each variety is 85% and the 
market share of the three high value varieties selected here is about 17%, a 
conservative estimation of the increase in consumer demand e is set to be 15%. 
Each simulation imposes exogenous shock(s) to the system of equations and 
generates empirical distributions for the changes in prices and quantities, and welfare 
changes for four apple outputs and two input factors used in four outputs. The 
empirical distributions are used to calculate the mean and a 95% confidence interval 
for price, quantity and welfare variables across 1,000 iterations (more iterations of the 
model have also been calculated, but the results do not differ greatly. Therefore I 
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report the mean value in the results table plus a 95% confidence interval.  
Table 2.3 shows price and quantity effects of the apple output and input markets 
focusing on the supply side. The four columns correspond to each of the simulation 
scenarios. The first column is the case when the U.S. apple market is subject to the 
policy change. The EU SPS regulation change affects the apples exported to the EU 
with postharvest disorder problems. With a natural decrease in apple export demand 
from the European market, the supply of high value high grade apple product 
decreases by 16.73%. This drop of 16.73% is distributed to a decrease of 13.98% of 
the farm input and a slight increase of the marketing input at 0.12%. The decrease 
supply of the farm input also affects high value cull apples by -0.58% because high 
value apples are intensive in the farm input. Decreasing the supply of all high value 
apples leads to increasing production of low value apples in both grades, as substitutes 
for consumers. So the policy shock decreases supply (and demand) of all high value 
apples for exports but have a positive effect on the low value apples. The derived 
demand of farm supply decreases which is mainly due to the lower MRL in the EU. 
Before an effective alternative is introduced, this trend is expected to continue. 
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Table 2.3. Simulation Results of Price and Quantity Changes 
  Policy Biased Tech 
Policy & 
Biased Tech 
Demand & 
Biased Tech 
  
-5% in high 
value high 
grade apple 
export demand 
+5% in farm 
supply for 
high value 
apple 
-5% in high 
value high 
grade apple 
export demand 
& +5% in farm 
supply input 
for high value 
apple 
+15% in high 
value high grade 
apple demand 
&+5% in farm 
supply for high 
value apple 
  Percent change in quantity (Confidence interval) 
Marketing 
Supply 
High 
grade 0.12 1.37 2.46 -0.03 
  (0.06, 0.18) (0.89, 2.01) (1.09, 2.98) (-1.86, -0.003) 
 Culls -0.17 2.17 0.18 0.04 
  (-0.22, -0.07) (1.96, 3.02) (-0.03, 0.34) (0.003, 0.12) 
Farm 
Supply High value -13.98 2.34 -12.61 3.49 
  (-15.01, -12.08) (1.08, 2.99) (-15.28, -9.98) (1.64, 5.03) 
 Low value 2.12 -0.01 4.29 -0.53 
  (1.88, 2.42) (-0.018, 0.12) (2.89, 5.01) (-2.05, -0.0068) 
Retail 
Price 
High value 
high grade -5.23 -1.04 -6.27 1.98 
  (-6.00, -4.46) (-2.22, 0.34) (-8.09, -3.02) (0.23, 3.53) 
 
High value 
culls 0.61 0.75 1.37 -0.15 
  (0.02, 1.23) (0.33, 1.02) (0.65, 2.05) (-1.23, 0.08) 
 
Low value 
high grade -2.17 -1.82 -3.99 0.54 
  (-2.80, -1.68) (-2.9, -0.06) (-5.02, -1.98) (0.10, 1.86) 
 
Low value 
culls 0.15 0.32 0.47 -0.04 
  (0.02, 0.28) (0.18, 0. 43) (-0.09, 1.53) (-2.06, 1.12) 
Apple 
Supply 
High value 
high grade -16.73 1.72 -12.19 4.18 
  (-18.01, -14.73) (0.98, 2.35) (-15.01, -8.92) (2.64, 5.83) 
 
High value 
culls -0.58 -0.37 -0.02 0.15 
  (-0.78, -0.38) (-1.88, 1.19) (-0.28, -0.01) (0.003, 0.25) 
 
Low value 
high grade 2.61 2.63 4.67 -0.65 
  (1.56, 3.58) (0.96, 3.56) (2.30, 5.99) (-2.39, 0.86) 
 
Low value 
culls 0.03 0.14 0.16 -0.003 
  (0.002, 0.036) (0.02, 0.30) (-0.01, 0.92) (-1.56, 1.63) 
Note: The 95% confidence intervals are based on empirical beta distributions generated 
by variances on underlying elasticity parameters. 
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In the second scenario, adopting the biased technological innovation increases the 
farm factor supply of the high value apples by 2.34% effectively. Together with the 
marketing input supply, the retail level supply of three types of apples except for high 
value culls all increase. The decrease in supply of high value culls apple proves the 
effectiveness of the biomarker, which is “upgrading” apples by avoiding further 
development of postharvest disorder problems. This “upgrading” contributes to a part 
of the high value high grade supply increase. Retail price of apples changes 
accordingly, and depends on the equilibrium status of the retail market. When 
adopting the biomarker technology is the only shock to the apple industry, the new 
technology seems to be an effective alternative to the banned farm input.  
It is meaningful to compare the results of simulation 2 and 3 to emphasize the 
degree of biasness of the technological innovation. In the presence of both policy 
change and adopting biased technology, high value apple supplies still drop (-12.19% 
and -0.02%). However, the drops in both grades of high value apples are smaller 
compared to the results in simulation 1. Moreover, all the results listed in column 3 
have the same sign as in column 1. But the absolute values of all the negative changes 
are smaller in simulation 3 compared to simulation 1; the values of all the positive 
changes are larger than in simulation1. Therefore, the biomarker technology 
effectively mitigates the effects of EU policy ban on the U.S. apple market.   
In the long run (simulation 4), the biomarker is being accepted by consumers. 
Better quality and higher grade apples are being produced because of the biomarker. 
With both positive impacts from the biased technology (+5%) and consumer 
recognition (+15%) on high value high grade apples, the farm supply of high value 
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apples increases by 3.49% (compared to 2.34% with only biomarker adoption in 
simulation 2) and low value decrease by 0.53% (compared to -0.01% with only 
biomarker in simulation 2). Meanwhile 0.03% less marketing input is need to sell high 
value apple products but 0.04% more for low value ones. Apple producers have to put 
more efforts on promoting low value apples sale. This result can also be observed in 
the retail level. Both grades of the high value apples increase by 4.18% and 0.15% for 
high grade and culls respectively, while the decreases of 0.65% and 0.003% happen 
for the low value high grade apple and low value culls. More high value apples are 
demanded and supplied while less low value apples are demanded and supplied. The 
price of the high value, high grade apple product increases by 1.98%. With this, higher 
profits for high value, high grade apple producers could be expected.  
In addition to the price and quantity results, Table 2.4 presents the welfare changes 
in the four simulations. In the first column, the SPS regulation change makes farm 
input producers lose 7.86 million dollars from the high value apple markets and 0.36 
million from low value one. Producers of marketing input gain a surplus of 11.32 
million dollars from the high grade apple but lose 20 million from culls. Producers are 
worse off in general, especially those who produce high value, high grade apples, 
which are mostly hurt by the EU policy ban. Consumers of high value high grade 
apples lose 79.91 million dollars because of the policy change. This may because of 
two reasons: 1) realizing the health risks by consuming high value high grade apples; 
2) fewer high value high grade are available in the market to consume. They could be 
better off if they switch to consume low value apples.  
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Table 2.4. Simulation Results Welfare Changes 
  Policy Biased Tech 
Policy & 
Biased Tech 
Demand & 
Biased Tech 
  
+5% in high 
value high 
grade apple 
demand 
-5% in farm 
supply for 
high grade 
apple 
-5% in high 
value high 
grade apple 
demand & 
+5% in farm 
supply input 
for high grade 
apple 
+5% in high 
value high 
grade apple 
demand 
&+5% in farm 
supply for 
high grade 
apple 
  Welfare change in million USD (Confidence interval) 
Producer 
Surplus 
Marketing  
High 
grade 11.32 -1.71 -24.40 -2.89 
  (9.90, 13.29) (-1.89, -1.65) 
(-27.06, -
21.24) (-3.81, -1.09) 
 Culls -20.00 0.12 -0.13 0.18 
  
(-22.01, -
18.65) (0.01, 0.19) (-1.02, -0.06) (0.06, 0.35) 
Producer 
Surplus 
Farm  High value -7.86 1.13 14.91 24.26 
  (-8.21, -5.96) (0.53, 1.82) (13.38, 15.56) (22.51, 26.12) 
 Low value -0.36 0.18 -4.56 -5.82 
  (-1.09, -0.02) (0.17, 0.31) (-5.10, -3.85) (-6.16, -3.08) 
Consumer 
Surplus 
High value 
high grade -79.91 -31.12 184.1 -474.9 
  
(-81.25, -
78.01) 
(-33.29, -
29.98) (179.2, 195.3) 
(-458.1, 
490.6) 
 
High value 
culls 0.31 -0.73 -0.45 -1.68 
  (0.19, 0.50) (-1.23, -0.28) (-1.02, -0.01) (-1.88, -1.02) 
 
Low value 
high grade 46.40 19.46 -8.15 117.1 
  (45.89, 46.96) (18.53, 21.02) (-9.66, -7.32) (112.2, 121.6) 
 
Low value 
culls 0.35 -0.66 -0.32 -1.62 
  (0.28, 0.46) (-0.18, -0.03) (-1.00, -0.08) (-1.99, -0.35) 
Note: The 95% confidence intervals are based on empirical beta distributions generated 
by variances on underlying elasticity parameters. 
 
With the biased technology, producers using the farm input the technology is 
biased towards are better off, especially those who produce high value apples, gaining 
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1.13 million dollar. Those who produce low value apples are also better off but at a 
much smaller level (0.18 million dollars). In the third scenario, in the present of both 
policy and technology shocks, the impact of the biased technology becomes more 
dominant in the welfare measure. With a policy specifically imposed on high value 
high grade apples, the biomarker benefits the producers of high value apples and hurts 
producers of low value apples. The producer surplus for the former is 14.91 million 
dollars and is -4.56 million dollars for the latter. Furthermore, in simulation four, with 
more consumer demand of high value apples, the producer surplus for the high value 
apple is 24.26, much more than it is in simulation 2. The double positive effects for 
high value high grade apple demand lead to a positive effect for producers, while the 
producer surplus of low value apple suffers a loss at 5.82 million dollars. The double 
pressure deteriorates the low value apple producers through the factor market. On the 
consumer side, consumers of the high value high grade apples lose welfare, with a 
consumer surplus loss of 474.9 million dollars. This loss may be caused by the 1.98% 
price increase of the apple in the retail level.  
2.4 Implication and Conclusion 
The focus of this paper is on the relationship between trade policy and biased 
technological innovation in agricultural markets. How will they shift production and 
consumption in a market and what changes will happen to welfare of each stakeholder 
in the market? The paper uses an example of the U.S. apple market. The EU changed 
its SPS regulation on imported apples. This particular policy change directly affects a 
key input – storage (farm input) in apple production. A biased technological 
innovation is a potential solution to the policy change. This paper evaluates the impact 
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of a trade policy change and the corresponding technology adoption to shed light on 
the effects of agricultural trade in a market with highly differentiated products. In 
addition, the paper tests a hypothesis on the biased technology to provide suggestions 
about production decision and technology adoption to producers and other 
stakeholders in the industry.  
Simulation 1 studies the impact of a European trade policy change on the U.S. 
apple market. Although the EU market only counts for about 16% (at most, in 1991) 
of the U.S. apple exports, it has a non-trivial impact on the U.S. domestic market. This 
is due to the complexity of non-tariff barriers in agricultural trade. As long as the U.S. 
apple producers would like to continue to export to the European market, they will 
have to rebuild the storage, sorting, packaging facilities and even transportation 
facilities to avoid cross contamination, to meet the new MRL made by the EU. In this 
case, producers who have the capacity will be able to earn substantial profits. Other 
producers will have to completely give up the EU market and suffer economic 
consequences.  
 The policy has a negative impact both on the U.S. apple input and output markets. 
It causes a producer welfare loss for those who intensively use the policy affected 
farm input and consumer welfare loss for those consume the exporting high value high 
grade apples. The U.S. government and other stakeholders in the apple industry should 
actively seek solutions to avoid the potential loss brought by the trade policy. In 
addition to looking for alternative storage methods, the U.S. apple producers should 
also explore other exporting destinations. 
Simulation 2, 3 and 4 show the effectiveness of the biased technological innovation 
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by studying the impact on the quantity and price and welfare of stakeholders.  The 
biomarker effectively increases supply of high value apples at both farm and retail 
levels, by enhancing the efficiency of postharvest storage in apple production. The 
long run impact indicates that if there is acceptance of this new technology in the 
future, then the consumer demand on high value high grade apples may increase. The 
development of such a technology should be supported from both public and private 
sectors. The technological innovation is important for every industry, especially the 
agricultural industry, which always involves multi-factor in production (Binswanger 
1974).    
Simulation 2, 3 and 4 also test the hypotheses that biased technology favors a 
certain output through the input factor for which the technology is biased towards. 
Producers that produce high value apples enjoy a welfare gain in the three scenarios. 
Others who produce low value apples suffer and have a welfare loss. This is consistent 
with the H0 raised in the conceptual model section. In the presence of a biased 
technology, the producers in the industry should diversify their production bundle by 
increasing production of the commodity that the technology is biased towards and 
decreasing production of other commodities. In this way, the producers could 
maximize their welfare and minimize risks from exogenous shocks such as policy and 
regulation changes, market failure and natural disasters. The initial cost to shift 
production will not be too high when the market includes highly differentiated 
products. The factors required in the production will not differ too much. 
To sum up, a country’s trade policy change will affect its trading partners. One 
response may be technological innovation to cater to the new policy so as to continue 
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to trade. These policy induced technologies may bias towards certain aspects in the 
production of the traded commodity to be in line with the changing direction of the 
trade policy. In our case, to meet the new MRL of DPA, a chemical as farm input, the 
new technology biases towards the farm input. The biased technology will bring shifts 
in production and consumption. Especially when the market includes highly 
differentiated products, the shifts are complex due to substitute effects between 
outputs, inputs and the vertical linkage between input and output markets. However, 
the complexity also brings opportunities for producers to avoid loss and enjoy 
additional surplus. In particular for the producers who produce the products that are 
affected mostly by the trade policy change, there will be a loss if there is no effective 
alternative/ technology. However, with a new technology the negative impact brought 
by the trade policy change can be mitigated. To gain more, the producers could shift 
their production more towards the products that the policy and biased technology 
affect most. Therefore in a market with highly differentiated products, with an 
effective policy induced technology, the trade policy shock may lead to net benefit for 
the producers in the exporting country if they adopt the appropriate technologies. 
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END NOTES 
1 The termination of the Bracero Program resulted in reduced availability of cheap 
immigrant labor for California and Florida growers. 
2 COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 772/2013 of 8 August 2013 - amending 
Annexes II, III and V to Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council as regards maximum residue levels for diphenylamine in or on 
certain products. Pear is another product targeted in the regulation in addition to apple. 
In this paper, I only focus on studying the apple market.  
3 Washington Grower Clearing house, 55th Annual Apple Price Summary for the 
2011-2012 Marketing Season 
4 Only the non-organic apples are considered in this research because organic apples 
are not applying DPA for postharvest storage. 
5 “The percentage of fruit deemed acceptable for a fresh market outlet is known as the 
“packout percentage.” For example, if a load of navel oranges has a packout of 64%, 
this means that out of 100 navel oranges, 64 were deemed acceptable for the fresh 
market. The remaining 36 were sorted out and sent to the processing plant.” (Muraro, 
Roka and Timpner 2007) 
6 Red Delicious, Golden Delicious, Granny Smith, Fuji, Gala, Braeburn, Jongold and 
Rome. 
7 The 50% of culls are upgraded into a higher grade is a general assumption based on 
the composition of culls. Culls are small size, non-normal shape, and apples not good 
looking. Some bad appearance is caused by the postharvest disorder (Rules and 
Regulations Relating To NEW YORK STATE APPLE GRADES. Available at: 
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http://www.agriculture.ny.gov/FS/pdfs/farmcircs/circ859.pdf) 
8 Full adoption is assumed here. 
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CHAPTER 3. HAS U.S. AGRICULTURAL POLICY DISTORTED 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE? A STUDY ON THE IMPACT OF PLANTING 
FLEXIBILITY ON U.S. EXPORTS 
3.1 Introduction 
In September 2002, Brazil requested consultations from the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) with the United States regarding a series of U.S. agricultural 
programs on cotton. Brazil charged that these U.S. agriculture programs were 
depressing international cotton prices so that reduced the quantity and value of the 
cotton exports from Brazil, causing damage to Brazil’s domestic cotton sector (WTO 
2014). After a decade-long negotiation between the United States and Brazil, in 
October 24th, 2014, this WTO dispute settlement was finally terminated. The two 
countries have reached a mutual agreement that “Brazil giving up its rights to 
countermeasures against the U.S. trade or any further proceedings in the dispute” 
while the United States operating the current Farm Bill 2014 consistent with the 
agreed terms and providing financial compensation to the Brazil cotton sector (USTR 
2014, USDA 2014). More details about the cotton case are shown in Table 3.1.  
The WTO arbitration on the U.S.-Brazil cotton case was made mainly because of 
1) the export credit guarantees1 that are prohibited as subsidies according to the WTO 
rule; 2) the marketing loan2 and counter-cyclical payments3 that caused serious 
prejudice to Brazil; 3) production flexibility contract (planting restriction) and direct 
payment4 programs are not “green box”5 measures (WTO 2014, USTR 2014, USDA 
2014). In points 2 and 3, the planting restriction is related to both the direct and 
counter-cyclical payments. It has aroused many discussions in the dispute settlement 
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panel (WTO 2014). It is important for countries to learn the scope of the WTO regime 
and dispute settlement process from this U.S.-Brazil cotton case for future domestic 
policy making. For this purpose, many researches have been done and they can be 
grouped mainly in two categories: 1) papers evaluating the WTO disputes settlement 
and negotiation mechanism by explicitly analyzing this case and the consequences of 
the WTO settlement decision (Goodloe 2013; Suyama et al. 2016 ); 2) papers 
examining the economic impact of the cotton case through analyzing the relevant 
policies (direct payment, commodity loan programs (where the marketing loan belong 
to) on the U.S. domestic market (Young et al. 2007; Gardner, Hardie and Parks 2010; 
Balagtas et al. 2012; Graddy-Lovelace and Diamond 2017). However limited research 
has been done to specifically study the impact of the planting restriction which affects 
both the direct and counter-cyclical payments. 
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Table 3.1. Timeline and Selected Brief Summary of the WTO Dispute Settlement DS267: United States – Subsidies on Upland 
Cotton 
Complainant: Brazil Respondent: United States 
27 September 2002 Request for Consultations received Brazil contented U.S. agricultural program (providing assistance to the 
U.S. upland cotton industry) is inconsistent with the United States’ WTO 
commitments;   
8 September 2004 Panel Report circulated 1. “Peace Clause1” did not apply to U.S. domestic support measures 
for upland cotton;  
2. Production flexibility contract and direct payment programs are 
not green box measures; 
3. The effect of marketing loan and counter-cyclical payments 
provided to United States upland cotton producers was significant 
price suppression, constituting serious prejudice to Brazil’s 
interests; 
4. Export credit guarantees were “export subsidies” (prohibited); 
5. The United States should withdraw prohibited subsidies without 
delay and remove the adverse effects or withdraw subsidies that 
caused serious prejudice to Brazil. 
3 March 2005 – 
2 June 2008 
Appellate Body Report 
31 August 2009 Arbitration Report circulated 
16 October 2014 Mutually acceptable solution on 
implementation notified  
1. Formal termination of the DS267 within 21 days; 
2. Brazil relinquish all rights to countermeasures against U.S. trade; 
3. The United States make a onetime final2 contribution of 300 
million USD to the Brazil Cotton Institute; 
4. New rules governing the fees and tenor U.S. domestic support 
measure and guarantees under the program of issue; 
Information are from WTO DS267 settlement report (WTO 2014) and Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR 2014)  
Note:1 Peace Clause – “Article 13 holds that domestic support measures and export subsidies of a WTO Member that are legal under the 
provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture cannot be challenged by other WTO Members on grounds of being illegal under the provisions of 
another WTO agreement. The Peace Clause has expired on January 1, 2004.” – WTO legal texts (Available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm) 
2 The United States have made monthly payments to the Brazil Cotton Institute for technical assistance and capacity building activities since the 
June 2010 Memorandum of Understanding between the two countries. 
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Both the direct and counter-cyclical payments are computed using the base acres6 
(USDA 2003). The direct payment program is a way to restrict the type of crops 
planted in the base acres, because the payments are not based on producer’s current 
production choice but are tied to acreage bases and yields. The payment amount for 
each crop year equals 85% of the farm’s base acreage times the farm’s direct payment 
yield times the direct payment rate (USDA 2003). Counter-cyclical payment is made 
to participating farmers when the marketing year average price received by farmers for 
a covered commodity is less than the target price, providing support counter to the 
cycle of market prices in the event of low crop prices (USDA 2003). The payment 
amount equals 85% of the farm’s base acreage times the payment rate (difference 
between the target price and average market price of the commodity) (Womach 2005). 
In order to receive both payments, the farmer should comply with another U.S. 
domestic policy – the planting restriction.  
Since 1990, the “Fruit/Vegetable and Wild Rice” restriction limits the planting of 
specialty crops7 on land that has historically been used to plant program crops8. This 
provision within “The 1990 Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act” which 
regulated the planting of any crop except fruits and vegetables on up to 25% of any 
participating program crop’s acreage base. “The 1996 Federal Agriculture 
Improvement and Reform Act” mandated that participants may plant 100% of their 
total base acreage to any crop, except with limitations on fruits and vegetables. 
“Planting of fruits and vegetables (excluding mung beans, lentils, and dry peas) on 
base acres is prohibited unless the producer or the farm has a history of planting fruits 
and vegetables, but payments are reduced acre-for-acre on such plantings” (USDA 
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1996 page 8). When the counter-cyclical payments were introduced in the 2002 Farm 
Bill, it is said that the recipients of direct and counter-cyclical payments have planting 
flexibility on their base acres except for fruits, vegetables and wild rice, and payments 
tied to base acres are partially or fully forfeited when fruits and vegetables are 
harvested. 
As a result, planting restrictions have the capacity to influence the amount of land 
that is used to produce program and specialty crops (Johnson et al. 2006). When 
binding, the planting restriction may reallocate base acres between fruit and vegetables 
versus program crops, in the direction of crowding out fruit and vegetable acres to 
grow program crops. Previous research on planting restrictions have 1) studied the 
barriers to switch to fruit and vegetable production in regions with high competition of 
land in alternative uses (Young et al. 2007; Thornsbury Martinez and Schweikhardt 
2007); 2) estimated the acreage response to a hypothetical removal of the planting 
restriction (Fumasi et al. 2006; Balagtas et al. 2013). These studies largely show that 
the planting restriction has small to modest effects on fruit and vegetable acres in 
selected regions. However, would these acreage relocation effects on base acres 
increase U.S. cotton exports in the international trade? If so, by how much? 
 According to the WTO, the planting restriction provision has effectively led to 
direct payments (of which the cotton program is a part) that are not “minimally trade 
distorting” (Johnson et al. 2006). The United States has listed direct payments as 
“green box” (minimally trade-distorting), given the direct payments are not tied to 
current market prices or production, or not tied to a specific crop. The cotton case let 
the WTO raise the question of whether direct payments should be exempt from WTO 
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to obligations (ie. being moved from “green-box” to “amber-box”9) (Goodloe 2013). 
Because of this, in the subsequent farm policy debates, the U.S. government has 
considered the elimination of the planting restriction to maintain the non- trade 
distorting property of the direct payment program (Johnson et al. 2006). 
The 2014 Farm Bill shows that the United States took action to modify their 
domestic policy in accordance with the WTO regulations on trade. In Title I 
concerning Crop Commodity Programs10 of the 2014 Farm Bill, both the direct and 
counter-cyclical payments have been eliminated. Naturally, the planting restriction, the 
existence of which depends on those payments has been eliminated too. To continue 
assisting the covered crops (corn and other feed grains, wheat, rice, soybeans and 
other oilseeds, peanuts, and pulses) producers in the transition period, several new 
programs11 were provided. The upland cotton producers (producing on land 
considered as “generic base acres”) were able to participate in a new cotton insurance 
program as part of the 2014 Farm Bill. Both new programs still provide price or 
revenue benefit to grain crop producers. Planting fruit and vegetables (including wild 
rice) on the base acres enrolled in the new payment program, are still discouraged as 
they receive smaller payments. The major change is that although the new programs 
are still based on historical base acres, they allow relocation of base acres with the 
most recent planting history and also allow updating of program yields used in the 
payment calculation.  
To better understand the planting restriction effects of fruit and vegetable acres 
reduction on the international trade, I examined the effects that the planting restriction 
had on land use in the United States when it was first introduced in 1990. I will first 
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econometrically estimate the planting restriction impact on U.S. land allocation 
between fruit vegetable crops and program crops. Then apply the estimation result to 
simulate how the planting restriction will affect U.S. crop trade if dropping it out.    
3.2 Acreage Response Estimation 
Agricultural economists have studied the impact of commodity policy on land use 
in the United States (Johnson 1950; Houck and Ryan 1972; Lee and Helmberger 1985; 
Wu 2000; McDonald and Sumner 2003). These papers have used a range of 
econometric methods for studying acreage responses to policy and other changes. 
However, the empirical literature studying the effects of farm polices on land 
allocation between crops has been very general and only captures the average effects 
of a bundle of different polices on land use (Moss and Schmitz 2008; Gardner, Hardie 
and Parks 2010; Balagtas et al. 2014).  
The combination of deficiency payments or production flexibility contract 
payments and the planting restriction together increased returns to growing program 
crops and decreased returns to growing fruit and vegetable crops on base acres (Young 
et al. 2007). Figure 3.1 shows the change in program crop acres between 1987 and 
1997. Soon after 1987, the planting restriction was introduced in the 1990 Farm Bill 
and therefore the 199712 acreage data is a suitable method to capture the effects of the 
planting restriction. In Figure 3.1, the light grey colored regions mainly on the east and 
west parts of the United States showed a decrease of 5% or more in acreage used to 
produce program crops. Along the East Coast and in the Midwest there are regions 
that have more than 5% acres being converted into program crops. Figure 3.2 is the 
county-level percentage changes in fruit and vegetable acres between 1987 and 1997 
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in some southern and eastern counties. There were 5% or more acreage decreases, and 
5% or more acreage increases in selected counties throughout the country. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. County-level changes in program crop acreage, 1987 to 1997 
 
Figure 3.2. County-level changes in fruit and vegetable acreage (including tree 
nuts, melons, and wild rice), 1987 to 1997 
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To examine these acreage changes more closely, a Difference-in-Difference (DiD) 
model with county specific data for individual crops is adopted. The approach exploits 
a discrete change in farm policy and geographic variation in implementation (Balagtas 
et al. 2013). The DiD model is ideally used to measure the change induced by a 
particular event or treatment in two distinct time periods. Here the time periods are 
pre- and post- 1990 Farm Bill, as this was the Bill that introduced the planting 
restriction. The policy change refers to the farmers with a history of program crop 
acreage that: (1) can receive program payments on those acres; and (2) are restricted 
planting fruit and vegetable crops on those acres.  
Different from the classic DiD model which has treatment and control groups so as 
to estimate the policy impact, this model measures the policy impact in a continuous 
scale. There is no distinction of control and treatment groups, but this DiD policy 
variable measures the degree to which the planting restriction is binding. The 
hypothesis is that the planting restriction led to a reduction in fruit and vegetable acres 
and an increase in program crop acres. The degree to which the planting restriction is 
binding for a given area of land is measured by the portion of the acreage that was 
previously used to produce program crops (so subject to the planting restriction). This 
hypothesis is tested while the acreage re-allocation between the two crop categories is 
estimated using the acreage data. In the subsequent step, the estimated acreage change 
will be used to simulate the impact of the planting restriction on U.S. exports of 
program crops.  
3.2.1 Econometric Model 
The following reduced-form econometric model was used to estimate changes in 
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fruit and vegetable acreage in county i: 
0 X'  i P i X i iAFV APβ β β ε∆ = + + +   
The dependent variable iAFV∆  is the change in fruit and vegetable acres of county i 
between 1987 and 1997; iAP  is the acres used for program crops in county i in 1987; 
X'i  is a vector of other covariates that influence fruit and vegetable acreage in 
country i and includes several agronomic variables. The term iε  is the stochastic 
error terms which captures unobserved factors that influence fruit and vegetable acres 
in county i.  
As mentioned before, the variable iAP   is the acres for program crops in county i 
in 1987. It measures the acres that were subsequently subject to the planting 
restriction. We interpret it as an exogenous policy treatment as producers did not know 
in 1987 that program crop acres would be restricted as a pre-condition for receiving 
farm payments. The corresponding parameter Pβ  is the DiD estimator of the effect 
of the policy on fruit and vegetable acres between 1987 and 1997, which we attribute 
to the planting restriction.  
Whether the DiD estimator could identify the policy effect depends on how well 
the model captures other factors (in addition to the policy change) that might influence 
county-level changes in fruit and vegetable acreage. Covariates were also included in 
the regression to describe factors known to influence cross-sectional and time-series 
variations in county-level plantings of fruits and vegetables. The total crop acreage in 
1987 of each county is included in vector Xi , because the total crop acreage affects the 
land area that is used to plant fruit and vegetables. The vector Xi  includes agronomic 
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and climatic variables that affect the suitability of land for fruit and vegetable 
production; this includes variables describing temperature, elevation, and net 
precipitation. In addition, there are unobservable factors that may describe how well 
land is suitable for fruit and vegetable planting such as urban development pressure, 
the relative demographics of specialty crop and program crop producers, specific 
market-level economic conditions, and regional technological innovations. To control 
for these conditions, state-level dummies in vector Xi  are included to control these 
factors in the state level. Other time-invariant unobservable factors are left in the error 
term, and do not bias estimates of the policy effect. Because the DiD estimator permits 
time-invariant selectin bias. 
In addition, the dependent variable iAFV∆  is left-censored by total fruit and 
vegetable acres in 1987. Because counties can reduce fruit and vegetable acreage by, 
at most, the total fruit and vegetable acreage in 1987. So equation (1) is estimated by a 
generalized Tobit estimator that allows each county to have a unique censoring value 
of the county’s total fruit and vegetable acreage. Moreover, since each county is 
different in size and in agricultural production capacity, so each observation is 
weighted by total crop area.  
3.2.2 Data 
County-level acreage data from the USDA Census are used to describe acres 
planted in various crops in 1987 and in 1997. The year 1987 is the pre- and the year 
1997 is the post-policy year. The data was organized into two crop categories: 106 
horticultural (fruit and vegetable) crops and 10 program crops. Soybeans were not 
added to base acres until 2002, and therefore are not included as a program crop 
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because the analysis focuses on the period prior to 2002. In addition, total acreage is 
calculated by adding remaining annual crops to the horticultural and program crops 
(164 crops in total).  
There are 3,143 counties and county-equivalents in the United States. The five 
counties in the state of Hawaii and the 27 county-equivalents in the state of Alaska are 
excluded from the data and the 80 counties that did not plant any annual crops in 1987 
and 1997 were not included in the analysis. Therefore, data from 3, 031 counties were 
used in the regression work. Table 3.213 lists the acres used to produce fruits and 
vegetables in 1987 and 1997. In addition, to show the relative changes in acreage of 
these two years, the ratio of fruit and vegetable acres to total cropland were calculated 
and also shown in Table 3.2. The second and fourth columns in Table 3.2 shows the 
actual acreages used to plant fruits and vegetables in 1987 and 1997. Columns three 
and five are the shares of fruit and vegetable acres of total acres in 1987 and1997. 
From this table, it appears that there were not significant changes in fruit and 
vegetable acres after 1990.  
The agronomic data were collected from the Rocky Mountain Research Station of 
USDA Forest Service – the Historic Climate data (1940-2006) for the 48 
conterminous states at the county spatial scale based on PRISM9 (Parameter-elevation 
Regressions on Independent Slopes Model) climatology (Coulson and Joyce 2010). 
The dataset contains monthly totals of precipitation in millimeters (mm), monthly 
means of daily maximum (minimum) air temperature in degrees Celsius (C), and 
computed monthly mean of daily potential evapotranspiration (mm) and mean grid 
elevation in meters (m).  
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Some adjustments were made to the agronomic data before being applied in the 
model. First, the maximum monthly temperature and the minimum monthly 
temperature were used to calculate an average monthly temperature. Second, 
evaporation was subtracted from the precipitation to calculate a measure of the net 
precipitation. As a result, there are four agronomic variables in vector X for each 
county in each time period: elevation, growing-period (the nine months including 
March to November), averages for temperature, and net precipitation.  
Table 3.3 shows the summary statistics for a sample of county-level data. The three 
top fruit and vegetable producing counties in the state of California were selected to 
provide a snapshot of the information contained in our dataset. As the table shows, 
almost all the acres used for horticultural crops increased from 1987 to 1997 in the 
three counties. However, these changes might have been due to various reasons other 
than the 1990 planting restrictions, so we employ a regression model to isolate the 
impacts of the policy change in 1990.  
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Table 3.2. Fruit and Vegetable Acreages and Share of Total Acreages in the 1987 and 1997 
State Fruit and vegetable Acres in 1987 Fruit and vegetable Acres in 1997 State Fruit and vegetable Acres in 1987 Fruit and vegetable Acres in 1997 
 1,000 acres % of all 
crops 
1,000 acres % of all 
crops 
 1,000 acres % of all 
crops 
1,000 acres % of all crops 
AL 60 2.06% 51 1.74% NE 204 1.11% 185 0.90% 
AZ 201 20.87% 265 21.37% NV 2 0.19% 2 0.24% 
AR 29 0.36% 23 0.24% NH 8 3.97% 7 3.89% 
CA 2855 30.82% 3432 34.10% NJ 112 18.80% 79 13.68% 
CO 215 3.25% 193 2.66% NM 58 4.79% 76 5.60% 
CT 10 4.64% 10 4.73% NY 352 5.58% 337 5.68% 
DE 81 14.70% 68 11.89% NC 129 2.91% 108 2.05% 
FL 1030 50.59% 1117 51.34% ND 488 2.31% 660 2.85% 
GA 198 5.18% 288 6.42% OH 83 0.77% 62 0.55% 
ID 447 7.84% 443 7.55% OK 63 0.68% 102 0.92% 
IL 79 0.35% 66 0.27% OR 326 7.97% 329 7.22% 
IN 34 0.28% 32 0.25% PA 140 2.26% 115 1.88% 
IA 7 0.03% 13 0.05% RI 4 20.30% 3 14.86% 
KS 14 0.06% 11 0.04% SC 74 3.95% 49 2.30% 
KY 9 0.14% 7 0.09% SD 8 0.05% 19 0.10% 
LA 32 0.76% 36 0.78% TN 27 0.51% 25 0.42% 
ME 26 4.95% 23 4.18% TX 404 2.07% 348 1.46% 
MD 50 2.76% 42 2.22% UT 42 2.46% 27 1.46% 
MA 42 13.18% 35 13.42% VT 7 0.70% 7 0.80% 
MI 841 10.06% 689 7.97% VA 69 1.89% 56 1.43% 
MN 384 1.86% 498 2.18% WA 543 10.12% 721 12.77% 
MS 29 0.62% 35 0.68% WV 20 2.06% 14 1.22% 
MO 28 0.18% 34 0.20% WI 428 2.93% 376 2.98% 
MT 20 0.16% 21 0.15% WY 34 1.19% 29 0.98% 
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Table 3.3. Descriptive Statistics of the Top 3 Fruit and Vegetable Producing Counties in CA, 2 Years 
County Year Program 
Acre  
(Base acre 
proxy) 
Acres of 
Veg 
Acres of 
Fruits 
Acres of 
F&V 
Total Acre Dummy Elevation Net Precipitation Temperat
ure 
Fresno 1987 459023 197639 144721 342360 1063042 0 1022.4 169.1 281.1 
 1997 
 
271243 196329 467572 1116687 1 1022.4 63.6 291.6 
Kings 1987 331154 23571 15368 38939 495464 0 106.6 23.5 372.5 
 1997 
 
30155 23874 54029 513354 1 106.6 -10.4 383.1 
Tulare 1987 302500 149553 17262 166815 680969 0 1311.2 140.5 259.3 
 1997 
 
166806 17244 184050 666813 1 1311.2 63.2 269.5 
Mean 
 
364225.7 69133 139827.8 208960.8 756054.8 
 
813.4 74.9 309.5 
Std.Dev. 
 
74539.46 80267.66 96931.17 167322 270077.7 
 
562.5 68.4 54.1 
Min 
 
302500 15368 23571 38939 495464 
 
106.6 -10.4 259.3 
Max 
 
459023 196329 271243 467572 200494 
 
1311.2 169.1 383.1 
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3.2.3 Results 
The purpose of the regression analysis is to test the hypothesis that the planting 
restriction led to a reduction in fruit and vegetable acreage and an increase in program 
crop acreage by considering the degree to which the planting restriction is binding. 
Also, the estimation results will provide a measure of the acreage re-allocation 
between the two groups of crops. The focus of the estimation is the policy variable, the 
estimated coefficient of variable iAP  which is the program crop acres in 1987. A 
negative coefficient on the variable implies that the more program crop acres county i 
has, the county is more likely to experience a larger reduction of fruit and vegetable 
acres due to the planting restriction. It also suggests that the planting restriction 
provision did crowd out the fruit and vegetable crops.  
Table 3.4 shows the results from estimations using all 3, 031 counties reporting 
crops. The first column presents results from using the change in area for all fruit and 
vegetable crops as the dependent variable. The coefficient for the key policy variable 
Pβ  is -0.0426, and it is statistically significant. The results indicate that the average 
effect of the planting restriction is a reduction in fruit and vegetable acres by 4.26 
acres for every 100 acres of program crops planted in 1987.  
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Table 3.4. Censored Regression Results, All U.S. Counties  
 Dependent variable is the change between 1987 and 1997 in fruit and vegetable area 
Explanatory variables Estimated coefficient Standard error 
1978 Program crop area -0.0426** 0.0158 
1987 Total crop area 0.0534** 0.0182 
Elevation -0.30130 3.9174 
Net precipitation -2.8896 2.9811 
Temperature -38.2052 43.8058 
Censored observations 615  
P-value for Wald test for significance of 
the regression 
0.000  
Note: 1) * and ** : significant at the 10% and 5% level respectively 
          2) All standard errors are computed using a robust estimator of the covariance matrix. Regression results for the state 
dummy variables and the intercept have been suppressed upon request.  
3) Sample size: 3,031 counties in 48 states 
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Assuming all the reduction in fruit and vegetable acres were converted to plant 
program crops as the upper bound of the planting restriction impact on land relocation. 
Therefore, with the planting restriction, there is a 4.26% increase in program crop 
acres. An important point to understand is how much is the reduction in fruit and 
vegetable acres for every 100 program acres? I use the industry share (λ ) of land to 
calculate this reduction (more about the industry share will be given in the later 
simulation section). Based on USDA census data, the average ratio of land used to 
produce fruit and vegetables versus program crops is approximately 2:8 (Stewart et al. 
2011). It means for 100 acres of land supply, 20 acres are dedicated to fruit and 
vegetables and 80 are used to plant program crops. Therefore the 4.26% increase in 
program crop acres would bring following impact on fruit and vegetable acres: 
program crop acres 4.26% 100
fruit and vegetable acres
×
= ×  
total land supply 4.26% 100
total land supply
grain
land
hort
land
λ
λ
× ×
= ×
×
  
4.26% 100
grain
land
hort
land
λ
λ
×
= ×   
0.8 4.26% 100
0.2
×
= ×  
17.0%=  
Using the estimation results, I calculate that the real effect of planting restriction on 
fruit and vegetable acres is a decrease of 17.0%. To capture the maximum impact of 
the land re-allocation from the planting restriction, I assume there could have been a 
4.26% increase in program crop acres and I use this percentage to study the planting 
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restriction effects on the international market for the United States and the rest of 
world including Brazil in the next section.  
3.2.4 Impact on the World Market 
According to my estimation results, the planting restriction did affect acreage 
allocation for both program crops and fruit and vegetable crops in the United States. 
However for the U.S.-Brazil cotton case, in order to claim that the planting restriction 
increased exports of program crops (cotton) into the international market and 
depressed the world price, two things should be clarified: 1) Will the planting 
restriction’s impact on input (land) markets affect price and quantity in output markets 
of fruit and vegetable and cotton? Will an increase (decrease) in price and quantity in 
the input market necessarily lead to an increase (decrease) of price and quantity in the 
output markets fruit and vegetable and cotton? 2) The impact on the program crop 
acreage is limited (4% in 1987). If there is a relationship between the input and output 
markets, by how much will the impact on the input market transfer to the output 
market? Moreover, will this impact also affect international markets? A simulation 
model with the estimated exogenous shocks is used to capture the effect of the 
planting restriction on international markets. The simulation will provide a clearer 
picture of the connection between a country’s domestic farm policy and international 
trade. It will also help to understand the effect of a country’s domestic policy on trade, 
as well as provide insights about the trade negotiation mechanism, and relevant WTO 
decisions.  
I model the effects of the planting restriction brought to the on international 
markets through its impact on U.S. domestic land allocation between horticultural and 
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program crops. A multi-input and multi-output model with international trade is 
adopted to simulate the impact of the planting restriction. There are two groups of 
crops in the model: fruits and vegetables (referred to as the horticultural crop) and 
program crops (referred to as the grain crop). The grain crop includes cotton, which 
was the focus of the U.S.- Brazil WTO case, and the issue that initiated the trade 
policy debate related to the planting restriction. Both groups of crops are exported by 
the United States and Brazil to the world market. Three common inputs (land, labor, 
and other inputs) are used to produce the two crops. The “other” input includes a set of 
factors of production such as fertilizer, fuel, irrigation, storage, and marketing 
services. The input market is closed and therefore the three inputs can freely move 
between the domestically produced crops, i.e. between horticultural and grain crops, 
but are not traded.   
The model describes a multi-input and multi-output market in an open economy 
with trade. It is based on Rickard, Okrent and Alston (2013) as an equilibrium 
displacement model adjusted following Sumner (2003) and Mohanty et al. (2005) to 
further focus the U.S.- Brazil cotton case. The basic argument behind the simulation 
model is illustrated in Figures 3a and 3b. To simplify the illustration, crops are 
produced using only one input. The grain crop is relatively dominant in terms of total 
factor usage. In the figure, I only focus on the export flow of grain crop as this was the 
focus of the Brazil cotton case. Horticultural crop trade is not discussed here but will 
be included in the simulation later. The impact of the planting restriction is reflected in 
the input market as a re-allocation of land input between horticultural and grain crops– 
a decrease in producing horticultural crops and an increase in producing grain crops. 
 69 
In Figure 3.3a, the original input supply for the two crops before implementing the 
planting restriction are hX and gX , where X represents the input supply. Subscript h  
denotes horticultural crop and subscript g  denotes grain crop. The total input supply 
is the bold Xs. The equilibrium input quantities supplied are h and g. With the planting 
restriction, an exogenous policy shock shifts hX  to the left to 'h  and shifts gX  to 
the right to 'g .  
Changes in the factor market affect output markets and trade flows are shown in 
Figure 3.3b. The original export quantity from the United States to the world market 
equals to t n− at the world price p . The amount of t and n are determined by output 
supply Qs and demand D. The change in input supply caused by the planting 
restriction shifts the output supply to Qs’. As a large country which has the power to 
influence world markets, the world grain price falls with the increasing supply. 
Therefore, the new level of U.S. exports to the world market is ' 't n− . The ' 't n− can 
be greater or less than initial exports t n− . Whether the grain exports are increased or 
decreased depends on the magnitude of input re-allocation, increase in grain supply 
and the supply response of horticultural crops. This example highlights the importance 
of cross commodity linkages through factor markets. More detailed analysis will be 
described in the simulation model section next. 
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Figure 3.3. The impact of the planting restrictions on input and output markets 
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3.3 Simulation Model 
To analyze the effects of the planting restriction on U.S. grain exports through 
changes in factor markets, specifically land re-allocation between grain and 
horticultural crops, an equilibrium displacement model is adopted. The basic form of 
the model is from Muth (1964). Subsequent developments to accommodate multiple 
input and output markets are used in Hertel (1989) and Sumner, Lee and Hallstrom 
(1999). The simulation model is developed and used to assess the impact of planting 
restriction impact on the U.S. crop market and in international markets. A set of basic 
equations is used to describe demand, export demand, domestic demand for the 
imported crop, supply and the corresponding factor markets. This equilibrium 
displacement model includes markets for four outputs and two factors in two regions. 
It is a simplification of the U.S. and the international crop markets, meanwhile it does 
capture the critical characteristics found in the industry and provides a useful 
framework to examine the impact of a policy change.  
There are N outputs from 1… N, categorized into two broad crop categories: grain 
and horticultural crops. There are two regions in the model, the United States and the 
aggregated rest of world (ROW). For simplification, there are two trade flows between 
the two regions: the United States exports grain crops to the ROW; and the ROW 
exports the horticultural crop to the United States. Both regions are large enough to 
have the capacity to influence world prices. I assume that the world price of grain and 
horticultural crops are equal to U.S. domestic grain price and the ROW domestic 
horticultural price. I do not consider the role of tariff barriers and therefore do not 
include tariffs in the price vector here. The two tradable outputs are produced using 
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three inputs: land, labor, and other agricultural production inputs (includes capital, 
fertilizer, fuel and marketing services).  
In order to better capture the acreage change in land use for both horticultural and 
grain crops, I explicitly list all the inputs. Land, labor, and other inputs are 
differentiated based on output crop types. For example, there are two land inputs: land 
for horticultural crops and land for grain crops. Superscript i denotes the output and 
subscript k denotes the input. The specific model is displayed as following: 
(1) ( , )i i
y y yQD f P V=    
(2) ( , )i i
y y yQX g P Z=   
(3) ( , )i i
y y yQM m P R=   
(4) ii i i
y y y yQS QD QX QM= + −   
( , )
(5) ii ki
i
y y y
y
y
TC W QS
P
QS
∂
=
∂
  
.
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(6) ik i
k
y y y
iy y
i k y
TC W QS
x QS
W
∂
=
∂
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k k k
y y y yXS h W U=   
,
1
(8)
k
N
y y
i k
i
XS x
=
=∑   
There are eight equations with eight unknown variables in the model. Equation (1) 
is the output demand, where i
yQD is the domestic demand of output i in region y. Two 
regions are denoted with subscript y here. The output price (domestic price) vector for 
all crops is denoted by P and the vector of exogenous variables is denoted by Vy. 
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Equation (2) is the export demand function, with i
yQX as the export demand for 
output i in region y and it is influenced by an exogenous vector of variables Zy. 
Demand in region y demand for the imported crop i, denoted as i
yQM is shown in 
equation (3) with a vector of exogenous variables Ry. Equation (4) is the output 
market clearing condition and i
yQS is the total supply of output i in region y. Equation 
(5) shows the competitive equilibrium and i
yTC is the region y total cost function of 
output i in region y. The equation shows the market clearing condition for domestic 
produced product i: marginal cost equals domestic price. The derived input k demand 
in region y is shown in equation (6), where 
k
yW is the price of input k in region y. 
Equation (7) is the supply function for input k in region y. The vector Uy denotes a set 
of exogenous variables that affect supply. Equation (8) is the input market clearing 
condition in region y.  
Total differentiating equation (1) to (8) yields the following linear elasticity model. 
Here ijyη is the demand elasticity of output i in region y with respect to the price of 
output. Similarly, the export demand elasticity is yxijη  and import demand elasticity is 
y
mijη . Parameter ,
y
i kγ is the cost share of input k in the production of output i in region 
y. Its summation over input k is equal to 1. The parameter ,
y
i klσ  is the Allen elasticity 
of substitution between input k and l used in the production of output i. In Equation 
(7’), kε  is the elasticity of supply of input k in region y. In the last equation, the 
industry share of input k in the production of output i in region y is denoted as ,
y
i kλ . 
After specifying the key parameters in the above system, the model will be used to 
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simulate the changes in the U.S. and international crop markets with a series of 
exogenous shocks driven by changes in the planting restriction.  
1
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3.3.1 Parameterization of the Simulation Model 
Value and sources for all of the baseline parameters that are used in the simulation 
model are listed in Table 3.5. Each will be discussed in detail here. For all the 
elasticities (elasticity of demand, export elasticity of demand and supply elasticity), I 
first obtained baseline values from the literature that studies issues related to the 
specific crops. Following Davis and Espinoza (1998), Zhao et al. (2000), and Rickard 
and Lei (2011), I applied prior distributions to the baseline elasticity parameters as a 
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way to conduct a sensitivity analysis. Setting the baseline parameter as the central 
tendency with a specified variance at 0.04 to develop beta (3,3) distributions (Brester, 
Marsh and Atwood 2004). Beta distribution is a family of continuous probability 
distribution which is symmetric when the two parameters are set to be equal. It has 
been applied to model the behavior of random variables limited to intervals of finite 
length in many disciplines including economic analysis. Because of this characteristic, 
the beta distribution is selected here to ensure negative demand elasticities and 
positive supply elasticities. The simulation model randomly draws values following 
beta distribution for these parameters to generate an empirical distribution of results 
with 100 iterations.  
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Table 3.5. Baseline Parameter Specification  
 Horticultural Crops Grain Crops Source 
Demand elasticity  
Horticultural Crops -0.63 0 Rickard, Orkent and Alston 
(2013) 
Grain Crops 0 -0.98 Rickard, Orkent and Alston 
(2013) 
    
Export Demand elasticity  
Horticultural Crops -1.44 0 Epperson and Lei (1989) 
Grain Crops 0 -1.40 Reimer Zheng and Gehlhar 
(2012) 
    
Domestic Demand elasticity of imports 
Horticultural Crops -0.88  FAOSTAT 
Grain Crops  -0.0098 FAOSTAT 
    
Input cost share by industry 
Land 0.54 0.45 UC Davis-Current Cost 
and Return Studies 
Labor 0.31 0.21  
Other inputs 0.15 0.43  
    
Industry input usage share 
Land 0.20 0.80 USDA Census data 
Labor 0.68 0.32  
Other inputs 0.59 0.41  
    
Input supply elasticities to crop production 
Land 0.2 0.2  
Labor 0.2 0.2  
Other inputs 1 1  
Note: The Allen elasticity of substitution (6×6) is not shown here due to limited space.  
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For the United States, the baseline demand elasticity is obtained from the paper of 
Rickard, Okrent, and Alston (2013). In the paper, they used latest data and estimated 
the demand elasticities for 9 major food categories in the United States. I used the fruit 
and vegetable elasticity for horticultural crop categories and the cereals and bakery 
elasticity as the elasticity for the grain category. For the export demand elasticity of 
grain crops, there are a number of estimations in the literature for U.S. crops such as 
soybean, corn and wheat. I have averaged the corn and wheat elasticities weighted on 
their shares in program crops to get a baseline value that is employed in the simulation 
model. Since soybeans were not included as a program crop in the 1990 Farm Bill; I 
haven’t incorporated these values in the baseline value calculation. As for the 
elasticity of import demand, Kee et al. (2008) has estimated the import demand 
elasticities of goods for a large set of countries. As a large country in the world 
market, the United States has very elastic import demand elasticity for general goods 
at the HS- 6-digit level. Here it is assumed that the United States is a net importer of 
horticultural crops. Therefore, it will be relatively less elastic compared to all other 
agriculture commodities and I set the baseline value of the elasticity of import demand 
for horticultural crops as -1.0. 
The baseline value of supply elasticities for the land and labor inputs are set at 0.2, 
which reflects limited movement of these resources out of crop production. The supply 
elasticity for the other inputs are set at 1.0 (Sumner, Lee and Hallstrom 1999). The 
aggregated input category is more elastic than labor and land because of its relative 
flexibility to move between sectors. The sensitivity analysis shows that the results do 
not depend heavily on the selection of the supply elasticities, and in general the results 
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do not change across a plausible range of elasticity values. 
The input cost shares are calculated based on the cost and return studies for major 
crops from University of California, Davis. I have selected major horticultural crops14 
produced and exported by the United States, and major grain crops15 in the program 
crop category. The industry factor usage share ikλ  are calculated using the county-
level data from the DiD regression estimation. The estimation of Allen elasticities of 
input substitution are not available from literature and therefore I follow other 
simulation studies (Sumner, Lee and Hallstrom 1999; Rickard and Sumner 2008) with 
multiple inputs and set ilkσ  to be 0 across different inputs and 1 for the same input.  
The elasticities and shares as for the ROW are obtained in similar ways. The 
demand elasticity of grain crops is derived from Food and Agricultural Policy 
Research Institute (FAPRI) elasticity database. The database offers elasticities of a 
number of commodities for many countries and regions. I have averaged the 
elasticities of Africa, EU, Oceania, EU, South America, and North America excluding 
the United States by market share to calculate the ROW demand elasticity of grain 
crops as -0.35. For horticulture crops, there are no direct estimates from the literature 
and so following Sumner, Lee and Hallstrom (1999), the ROW demand elasticity of 
horticulture crops is set as -0.83. The export demand elasticity for horticultural crop is 
obtained from the USDA-ERS study of international food demand. Some aggregations 
across countries by market share are made to calculate the elasticity for ROW as -1.06. 
The import demand elasticity of grain crops for the ROW follows Kee et al. (2008) 
and is set to -1.5. 
Because the ROW are aggregated major trading countries in the world, it is 
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difficult to find appropriate average input or industry shares for all the countries, I 
follow the “20%:80%” rule (Reed, Elitzak and Wohlgenant 2002) of farm margin to 
estimate the cost shares. The industry input usage shares are proportions of total input 
used by all industries. Thus for each input, the shares across industries sum to one. 
Given the ROW is a net horticultural crop exporting region and the horticultural crops 
are more important users of labor and other inputs, I have assumed that the industry 
share in the horticultural industry in the ROW as 7:2:1 (for labor, other, and land 
input); the industry shares in the grain industry in the ROW is 5:2:3 (for labor, other, 
and land input). As mentioned before, the Allen elasticities of input substitution are set 
to 0 across different inputs and 1 for the same input. The industry input usage shares 
here are the calculated average share of the top five horticultural exporting countries 
according to the Johnson (2016). 
The model also requires the cross-price elasticities between imported and 
domestically produced horticultural or grain crops. With no reliable empirical 
estimates in the literature, the Slutsky equation in elasticity form implies that the ratio 
of Marshallian cross-price elasticities between goods i and j, ij
ji
η
η
 equals the 
expenditures on good j divided by expenditures on good i when their income 
elasticities are the same. Therefore, for the United States, I use data on the value of 
domestic production as a share of imports (Johnson 2016). The elasticity ratio of 
domestic horticultural products and imported horticultural products is approximately 
2.5. For the ROW in 2015, U.S. grain exports were about 0.21 of the world grain 
export market (USDA FAS 2017). These share values are used to develop the ratio of 
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the cross-price elasticities. 
3.3.2 Simulation Results and Discussion 
With the specified set of baseline parameters, I use the model to simulate the 
effects of the planting restriction on the international market for horticultural and grain 
crops. One way to examine the effects is to see what will happen in the international 
markets once the planting restriction is eliminated. Because the U.S. 2014 Farm Bill 
did eliminate the planting restriction by repealing the direct and counter-cyclical 
payment programs. I now measure the economic impact of eliminating the planting 
restriction on U.S. and international markets based on the estimation results from the 
1987 - 1997 period. The results could serve as a prediction of the acreage re-location 
between horticultural crops and grain crops for the time period when the U.S. - Brazil 
cotton case took place. 
Based on the estimation results from the DiD model, lifting the planting restriction 
will increase horticultural crop (fruit and vegetable) acres by 17.0% and decrease the 
grain (program) crop acres by 4.26%. These two percentage changes in the land input 
market are the exogenous shocks to the simulation model via equation (7’) on the land 
use for horticultural crops and land use for grain crops in the United States. The price 
and quantity changes in the input markets and output markets are reported for a 17% 
increase on land use for horticultural crops and a 4.26% decrease on land use for grain 
crops after eliminating the planting restriction.  
Table 3.6 shows the simulation results for the input market. The first column of 
Table 3.6 shows the input price and quantity changes of horticultural crop production; 
the mean value is shown along with the 95% confidence interval. There is an increase 
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of the land input used for producing horticultural crops by 1.1%. Accordingly, the 
supply of labor and other inputs both increase by 0.13% and 1.5%, respectively. The 
second column presents the changes in land used for grain crops. All three inputs 
decrease, and the land input decreases most at 1.2%. The smaller decreases in the 
factors are a reflection of the inelastic property of input supply. Based on both 
columns, without the planting restriction, land resource is relocated from planting 
grain crops to horticultural crops. But the relocating amount is not much, so are the 
labor input and the other inputs.  
Table 3.6. Simulation Result of the U.S. Input Markets 
  Horticultural crops Grain Crops 
  Percent change in quantity (Confidence interval)* 
Supply Land 1.1 -1.2 
  (0.9, 1.2) (-1.3, -0.8) 
 Labor 0.13 -0.2 
  (0.07, 0.2) (-0.4, -0.03) 
 Other Inputs 1.5 -0.7 
  (0.5, 2.5) (-0.8 -0.7) 
    
Price Land 0.05 -1.3 
  (0.001, 0.08) (-1.9, -0.008) 
 Labor 1.2 0.03 
  (0.8, 1.8) (0.01, 0.26) 
 Other Inputs -0.03 0.2 
  (-0.1, -0.02) (-0.04, 0.3) 
Note: *The 95% confidence intervals are based on empirical beta distributions 
generated by variances on underlying elasticity parameters. 
 
The quantity changes of the three inputs also lead to prices changes of the three 
inputs. The prices of land input and labor input for horticultural crop production 
increase by 0.05% and 1.2% respectively. While the price of other inputs for 
horticultural crop production decreases a little by 0.03%. As for the grain crop 
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production, the land input price decreases by 1.3% while the prices of labor input and 
other input increase by 0.03% and 0.2% receptively.  
The impact on the U.S. output markets are shown in Table 3.7. In the first column, 
we observe a 2.7% increase of the total horticultural supply in the United States. This 
leads to a decrease in U.S. imports of horticultural crops from the ROW by 0.5% and 
the price of the horticultural crops decreases by 0.01%. For the grain crops, there is a 
1% decrease in the U.S. grain crop supply and an increase in the world grain price by 
0.01%. Meanwhile, the export demand of the grain crops faced by the United States 
decreases by 2.3% which might be the result of the grain price increase.  
Comparison of the simulation results for the ROW output markets is shown in 
Table 3.8. In the first column, the domestic supply of the ROW horticultural crop 
increases by 0.04%. Although the export demand of horticultural crops decreases by 
0.2%, but the world price of horticultural crops decreases by 0.01%. This might have 
resulted in the supply drop of horticultural crops in the ROW. The second column of 
Table 3.8 lists the results for price and quantity changes for grain crops in the ROW. 
Because of the changes in the U.S. grain market, the grain crop supply of the ROW 
increases by 0.4% and leads to a 0.42% decrease in the imports of grain crops. As a 
price taker in the grain crop market, the ROW faces a 0.01% increase in the grain crop 
price. Table 3.8 also shows the planting restriction has limited impacts on U.S. grain 
crop trade. Eliminating the planting restriction increases the ROW grain crop 
production slightly, but this supply increase may still lead to an increase in the grain 
crop market share for the ROW. The decrease of the ROW imports of grain crops of 
0.42% might be a result of the increasing of world grain price. Reducing importing 
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grain crops from the United States, there can be an increasing of internal trade among 
countries of the ROW. With the world grain price increase, the grain producers in the 
ROW may benefit. I will discuss the welfare impact later.  
Table 3.7. Simulation Result of the U.S. Output Market 
 Horticultural crops Grain Crops 
 Percent change in quantity (Confidence interval)* 
Supply 2.7 -1.0. 
 (2.5, 3.5) (-2.4, 0.1) 
   
Export Demand - -2.3 
  (-2.5, -1.6) 
   
Domestic Demand of Imports -0.5 - 
 (-0.9, -0.1)  
   
Price -0.01 0.01 
 (-0.03, -0.006) (0.003, 0.12) 
Note: *The 95% confidence intervals are based on empirical beta distributions 
generated by variances on underlying elasticity parameters. 
 
Table 3.8. Simulation Result of the ROW Output Market 
 Horticultural crops Grain Crops 
 Percent change in quantity (Confidence interval) * 
Supply 0.04 0.4 
 (0.01, 0.1) (0.1, 0.7) 
   
Export Demand -0.2 - 
 (-0.3, 0)  
   
Domestic Demand of Imports - -0.42 
  (-2.3, -0.27) 
   
Price -0.01 0.01 
 (-0.03, -0.006) (0.003, 0.12) 
Note: *The 95% confidence intervals are based on empirical beta distributions 
generated by variances on underlying elasticity parameters. 
 
Elimination of the planting restrictions in the United States will re-allocate the land 
input: increase the land supply for horticultural crop and decrease the land supply for 
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the grain crop in the United States. The trade flows between the United States and the 
ROW of both crops will also change with changes in the world prices. Based on the 
quantity and price changes, the simulation results suggest that eliminating the planting 
restriction would have decreased the export of grain crops from the United States to 
the ROW and allow the ROW to produce more grain crops. To study the welfare 
changes associated with eliminating the planting restrictions, I calculated the surplus 
changes for both the United States and the ROW. 
The following equations are used to calculate the changes in welfare accruing to 
consumers of product i and to producers of factor k in region y. Welfare is measured in 
terms of changes in factor and product prices and quantities in the following 
equations: 
ΔCS =-P QD EP [1+0.5EQD ]       (9)y y y y yi i i i i   
ΔPS =W XS EW [1+0.5EXS ]        (10)y y y y yk k k k k  
The initial product and factor prices and quantities for grain crops and horticultural 
crops were introduced previously as part of the elasticity estimations. I have obtained 
aggregate product price and quantity information from the Johnson (2016), USDA 
Census, and USDA FAS for the United States and the ROW. For the horticultural data 
in the ROW, quantity information is obtained for U.S. imports; the price information 
is aggregated data from top 14 horticultural exporting countries, particularly those that 
the United States had imports from in 201516. For both the United States and the 
ROW, the factor quantities are calculated based on output quantities following the 
fixed factor assumption. The factor prices are calculated according to the “20% and 
80%” rule based on output prices. Both calculations are weighted on market shares. 
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The change in total producer surplus in region y is the sum of the producer surplus 
from each factor market: y yk
k
ΔPS = (ΔPS )∑  and the change in the total consumer 
surplus in region y is the sum of the consumer surplus across output markets
y y
i
i
ΔCS = (ΔCS )∑ . Results for the welfare changes are shown in Table 3.9.  
The first column of Table 3.9 shows the welfare changes in the United States after 
eliminating the planting restriction. Producers of horticultural crops have an increased 
surplus of 2.6 million United States dollar (USD) and the producers of grain crops 
have a surplus reduction of 3.1 million USD. These changes may be due to the input 
price changes for horticultural and grain crops. Consumers of the horticultural crops 
has a surplus increase of 1.4 million USD. This might be due to the decreasing price of 
the horticultural crops. While consumers of the grain crops has a surplus loss of 0.3 
million USD, which could be the result of the world grain price increase and reducing 
the supply of grain crops. The second column of Table 3.9 shows the results for the 
ROW. Here is a 1.6 million USD reduction in welfare for horticultural crop producers 
and a 2.0 million USD welfare gain for the grain crop producers. These changes might 
be due to the changes in the supplies of horticultural and grain crops. Consumers of 
horticultural crops have a welfare gain of 0.4 million USD while consumers of grain 
crops have a welfare loss of 0.2 million USD in the ROW which might be due to the 
world grain price increase.  
Based on the welfare calculations, overall the net consumer welfare changes in the 
United States and ROW are both gains of 1.1 million USD and 0.2 million USD 
respectively. This may be due to the decreased prices and increased consumption of 
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domestic/local goods. Moreover, the net U.S. producer welfare change is negative 
with a gain for horticultural crop producers and a loss for the grain crop producers. 
The net producer welfare change of the ROW is positive however with a loss to the 
horticultural crop producers but a gain to the grain producers. With the positive 
consumer welfare of the ROW, the overall net welfare is also positive. Based on the 
welfare results, eliminating the planting restriction reduces the welfare for certain 
groups of stakeholder but overall it benefits the ROW producers and consumers.  
Table 3.9. Welfare Result of Eliminating the Planting Restriction 
 The United States ROW 
 Welfare change in 2015 million USD (Confidence 
Interval) * 
Horticultural producer 2.6 -1.6 
 (1.9, 2.6) (-1.8, -1.4) 
   
Grain producer -3.1 2.0 
 (-3.2, -2.9) (1.9, 2.8) 
   
Horticultural Consumer 1.4 0.4 
 (1.3, 1.7) (0.3, 0.6) 
   
Grain Consumer -0.3 -0.2 
 (-0.8, -0.1) (-0.8, -0.1) 
Note: *The 95% confidence intervals are based on empirical beta distributions 
generated by variances on underlying elasticity parameters. 
 
3.4 Conclusion and Implication 
The focus of this paper is to understand how U.S. domestic farm policy is linked to 
trade disputes and international trade. The paper first estimates the acreage response to 
the planting restriction introduced in the 1990 Farm Bill. The planting restriction 
affects acreage allocation between program crops (grain crops) and horticultural crops 
(fruit and vegetable). The U.S – Brazil cotton dispute forced the U.S. government to 
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rethink its domestic farm policy and led to the elimination of the planting restriction 
along with direct and counter-cyclical payments in the 2014 Farm Bill, in addition to 
other commitments and compensations made to Brazil. To understand whether the 
planting restriction had an impact on the international grain market, in particular the 
cotton market, a simulation model was built to analyze the elimination of the planting 
restriction. 
The use and development of the economic simulation model relies on existing 
agricultural models and other elasticity estimates. A set of estimates was used as the 
baseline values and were borrowed from current and well-cited literature. In addition, 
additional simulation results show that my findings are not sensitive significantly to 
the values of parameters used in the model. Other econometric studies about the effect 
of removing U.S. subsidies for upland cotton have found much bigger or even 
opposite effects than those identified in this study (Sumner 2003). This is because in 
this paper I specifically examine the planting restriction rather than all polices applied 
to U.S. agricultural markets. Because the planting restriction is the key that makes 
other decoupled U.S. policies become trade distorting, it is important to detangle it 
from other policies and analyze the specific impact of the planting restriction on the 
cotton trade dispute.  
In addition, this is the first study to use results based on county-level data to 
simulate the economic impact of removing the policy in the international market. The 
exogenous shocks which are important to a simulation model tend to be more 
accurate. The estimation results from the county-level data were able to capture 
detailed changes in acreage response to policy. When using more aggregate data, 
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different changes in individual county’s acreage responses may be ignored in the 
estimation. Moreover, my simulation model incorporates multiple crops. It is 
important for an agricultural policy simulation framework to include multiple 
commodities as the different crops can compete for the same land. In addition, some 
crops have a complement or substitute relationship in demand and policy changes for 
one crop can influence production and demand of other commodities. 
Although the planting restriction indeed affected the planting and supply of U.S. 
domestic grain crops, the simulation results show that eliminating the planting 
restriction brings limited benefit to U.S. producers, with a producer surplus gain of 
horticultural crop producers but a loss of grain crop producers. The benefit to the 
ROW is also limited but towards what the Brazil government hoped and followed the 
WTO dispute settlement arbitration. The world price of grain crop increases a little 
and along with it the grain crop producers in the ROW enjoy a surplus gain (though 
the producer surplus of horticultural crop growers in the ROW loses). With this U.S. 
domestic policy change, the ROW grain crop producers would have been better off 
with an increase in their grain crop production and a larger market share in the world 
grain market (as intra-regional trade which cannot be captured in this model setting 
up).  
In general, the paper finds that the planting restriction has a limited impact on 
world grain trade. This result is consistent with the finding made by the WTO dispute 
settlement panel on the U.S. – Brazil cotton case. The panel found that the U.S. 
planting restriction is trade distorting, but the loss it caused to Brazil may not be 
serious because Brazil failed to prove a necessary causal link between the planting 
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restriction and significant price suppression. However because the planting restriction 
is the key that makes other decoupled U.S. policies become trade distorting, it directly 
affects the direct and counter-cyclical payments (the latter is judged to have caused 
significant price suppression by the WTO). Hence the planting restriction has been one 
of the focuses in the U.S. – Brazil cotton case and was eliminated in the 2014 Farm 
Bill. 
There are limitations of the current analysis given the data and information 
availability. The assumption of the complete acreage relocation between horticultural 
crops and grain crops after removing the planting restriction may not be true in reality. 
Given the production requirement and capacity constrain, the land used to grow grain 
crops or particularly upland cotton may be used to plant other grain crops or crops 
with similar farming requirement rather than fruit and vegetables. In addition, 
according to Young et al. (2007), the land relocation after lifting the planting 
restriction is mostly likely from California, the Upper Midwest, and the coastal plain 
in the Southeastern States where the grain producers are mostly likely to switch from 
planting grain crops to fruit or vegetables. But the acreage shifts in these regions 
would not necessarily be large because the current planting restrictions may not 
always be binding for some producers. For example, some producers might have not 
followed the planting restriction in the first place by leasing non-base land, planting 
fruit or vegetables on owned (base) acres, and reconstituting the farm entity to 
preserve government payments. In addition, with the flexibility of growing fruit and 
vegetables on base acre, the grain producers might still be hesitating to switch to plant 
fruit or vegetables. Because securing sufficient labor for harvesting, the difficulty in 
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establishing pre-harvest marketing contract with buyers, and other agronomic factors 
would also deter many grain producers. Given all these constraints, the result from the 
paper can still impose some implication for future studies in related issues.  
With increasing global interdependency and growing international trade, domestic 
agricultural policies are becoming more and more influential to other countries 
through international trade. The planting restriction and the decade-long cotton dispute 
may serve as an example. Based on this paper’s analysis, policy makers should be 
more careful in domestic policy design, particularly to some domestic policy which 
may not directly link to trade but have the capacity to distort trade through decoupled 
programs. Meanwhile, it is expected that the WTO will continue to clarify the 
regulations, design more supportive agreements, and improve the trade negotiation 
and dispute settlement mechanism.  
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END NOTES 
 
1 Export credit guarantee program (GSM-102) provides credit guarantees to encourage 
financing of commercial exports of U.S. agricultural products. Specifically it reduces 
financial risks to lenders, credit guarantees encourage exports to buyers in developing 
countries mainly (USDA FAS. Available at: 
https://www.fas.usda.gov/programs/export-credit-guarantee-program-gsm-102). Now 
(2017) the upland cotton is covered in the program anymore. 
2 Marketing loans were started for rice and upland cotton in 1986 under provisions of 
the 1985 Farm Act. Later it included other crops such as soybeans, other oil seeds, 
wheat, and feed grains. Producers can benefit from the marketing loan program when 
they repay the loan at a lower prevailing world market price (at which the repayment 
rates for upland cotton is based on) (Westcott and Price 2001). 
3 Counter-cyclical payment is defined as transfers that vary inversely with market 
prices and are available for eligible commodities under the 2002 Farm Act whenever 
the effective commodity price is less than the target price. The payment amount for a 
farmer equals the product of the payment rate, the payment acres, and the payment 
yield. Payments are tied to historical base acres and program yields (ERS, 2010). 
4 Direct payments are defined as annual transfers to producers from the government 
based on payment rates specified in the 2002 Farm Act and a producer’s historical 
program payment acres and yields (ERS, 2010). 
5 Green-box: The green box is defined in Annex 2 of the Agriculture Agreement. In 
order to qualify, green box subsidies must not distort trade, or at most cause minimal 
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distortion (paragraph 1). They have to be government-funded (not by charging 
consumers higher prices) and must not involve price support (WTO website). 
6 Base acreage is defined as farm’s crop-specific acreage of wheat, feed grains, upland 
cotton, rice, oilseeds, or peanuts eligible to participate in commodity programs under 
the 2002 Farm Act (ERS, 2010). 
 7 Specialty crops are defined as fruits, vegetables, tree nuts, dried fruits, nursery 
crops, and floriculture. They are also referred to as horticulture crops (ERS, 2010). 
8 Program crops are defined as crops for which Federal support programs are available 
to producers, including wheat, corn, barley, grain sorghum, oats, extra long staple and 
upland cotton, rice, oilseeds, peanuts, and sugar (ERS, 2010). 
9 Amber-box: All domestic support measures considered to distort production and 
trade (with some exceptions) fall into the amber box, which is defined in Article 6 of 
the Agriculture Agreement as all domestic supports except those in the blue and green 
boxes. These include measures to support prices, or subsidies directly related to 
production quantities (WTO Glossary:  Available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/amber_box_e.htm.) 
10 The 2014 Farm Bill available at: http://www.ers.usda.gov/agricultural-act-of-2014-
highlights-and-implications/crop-commodity-programs.aspx#.U2QQx_ldXuM 
11 Two new programs—Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and Agriculture Risk Coverage 
(ARC). Producers of covered commodities (corn and other feed grains, wheat, rice, 
soybeans and other oilseeds, peanuts, and pulses) can choose to enroll in one of the 
two programs - USDA Farm Policy Glossary 
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12 Although data in 1982 and 1992 are available, they are not used in the model 
because: data from 1982 was from a different source of 1987, 1992, and 1997 data; 
and the 1992 data may not be able to capture the changes of land use immediately 
after 1990 policy change. 
13 Data in Table 3.2 are from U.S. Census Report on Total Cropland acres and 
Program crop acres in 1987 and 1997 (USDA Census of Agriculture Historical 
Archive. Available at: 
http://agcensus.mannlib.cornell.edu/AgCensus/censusParts.do?year=2002) 
14 Major horticultural crops are selected: almonds, avocado, asparagus, blackberry, 
blueberry, broccoli, cabbage, celery, cherry, citrus, grapes, lettuce, melon, peach, pear, 
plum, prune, raspberry, strawberry, tomato, and walnut. 
15 Major grains in the program crops are selected: corn, cotton, oats, rice, sorghum, 
and wheat. 
16 By the share of total import value in 2015, top horticultural suppliers of the World in 
particular of the United States are Mexico (44%), Canada (13%), Chile (8%), the 
European Union (7%), China (6%), Peru (5%), and Costa Rica (3%). Other leading 
suppliers were Guatemala, Thailand, Brazil, Argentina, Turkey, the Philippines, and 
Ecuador. All other importing countries accounted for about 5% of trade. (Johnson 
2016) 
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CHAPTER 4. REVISITING HOW NONTARIFF MEASURES ARE QUANTIFIED: 
BARRIERS APPLIED TO INPUTS IN MARKETS WITH DIFFERENTIATED 
PRODUCTS 
4.1 Introduction 
Nontariff measures (NTMs) are becoming the major source of trade distortions 
contribute to fall in recent international trade negotiations (Yue Beghin and Jensen 
2005; Liu and Yue 2009; Orefice 2017). In general, NTMs are the collection of 
policies other than tariffs that restrict and distort trade by changing quantities or 
prices, or both simultaneously (Liu and Yue 2009; Imbruno 2016). Some of the most 
commonly used NTMs include: import quotas, customs and administrative 
procedures, technical barriers to trade (TBTs), sanitary and phytosanitary barriers 
(SPSs), and rules of origin (Liu and Ye 2009; Imbruno 2016).  
Among the various NTMs, the SPSs and the rules of origin are particularly 
prevalent in agricultural and food trade, especially in the period since the Doha Round 
negotiation (WTO 2001). The increasing use of SPSs and rules of origin is related to 
consumers’ growing concerns on product quality and food safety issues (Korinek, 
Melators and Rau 2008; Beestermoeller, Disdier and Fontagne 2016). These concerns 
are also shared by governments as we see increased regulations in this area as a major 
topic in trade agreement negotiations. For example, in the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and the United States, there is heated 
discussion about government regulations concerning NTMs. 
The TTIP has been under discussion since July 2013. It is aimed to increase trade 
and investment cooperation between the United States and the EU; it also aimed to 
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harmonize standards and regulations across product and service sectors of the two 
regions (Seshadri 2013). According to the latest U.S.- EU joint report on TTIP 
progress released in January 2017, many discussions have been made about NTMs 
(USTR 2017), such as provisions surrounding SPSs, uniform standards and 
certification requirements. These discussions are not only about trade between 
developed economics, but also the potential impact of TTIP on developing countries, 
specifically on how to help developing countries meet the NTMs imposed by 
developed countries. In fact, the NTMs are of particular concern to exporters in 
developing countries, as they are a major impediment to international trade and can 
prevent market access (Khouilid and Echaoui 2017).  
Despite the importance of NTMs in international trade, there are no already 
identified methods to quantify the effects of NTMs in the economics literature. 
Deardorff and Stern (1998) pointed out specific details of the NTMs are needed to be 
carefully looked at when choosing the quantifying methods, such as product type, 
imposing scope and so on. Many other research have been studied the same topic by 
reviewing available methods in the literature and adopt a most appropriate one for 
their specific purpose in quantifying the effects of a particular NTM (Beghin and 
Bureau 2001; Anderson and Wincoop 2004; Ferrantino 2006; Disdier, Fontagne and 
Mimouni 2008; Hoekman and Nicita 2011). The choice of appropriate quantify 
methods is important. These methods need to incorporate specific characteristics of 
the traded product and the careful details on the imposed regulations (Beghin and 
Bureau 2001; Agrekar 2017). However a better analysis of the effects of NTMs on 
trade is important not only for understanding the effects of regulations in ongoing 
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trade negotiations, but will also clarify concerns among policy makers and others 
involved in the negotiations. There are a number of reasons why we need to further 
develop modeling effects of NTMs.  
 First, it is necessary to assess the actual effects of the NTMs to make decisions on 
trade agreement discussions such as in TTIP. This is because the attention in 
international trade has shifted from tariffs to countries’ domestic regulations that affect 
production and trade (Beghin and Bureau 2001). Second, in order to solve trade 
disputes better, an effective technique to accurately estimate damages to trading 
partners caused by a country’s mandated regulations is crucial. This type of estimation 
work also serves as a basis for calculating compensation claims. Third, the NTMs set 
up by developed countries have the capacity to create obstacles for exporters in 
developing, especially within the agricultural and food product sector (Cato and Lima 
dos Santos 1998; Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh 2000; Black and MacBean 2016; 
Murina and Nicita 2017). Developing countries are often motivated to enter the 
developed countries’ markets (Hoekman and Nicita 2011) in the agriculture and food 
sectors since the Uruguay Round. However, previous exporting experiences show that 
the developing countries have gained little welfare, or even had welfare losses due to 
the NTMs imposed by developed countries (Fischer et al. 2008; Murina and Nicita 
2017). Whether the NTMs are prohibitive or not, the compliance costs have led to 
increased trading costs for firms in developing countries (Fischer et al. 2008).  
Motivated by the current TTIP negotiation which includes a focus on harmonizing 
NTMs, this paper first revisits previous studies on the impact of NTMs on 
international trade, particularly in the agricultural and food sector. Methods that have 
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been used to quantify the trade effects of NTMs are in agricultural input markets are 
summarized as a first step. The reason to focus on regulations on agricultural inputs is 
because this is the most common part of the supply chain that involves NTMs in 
agricultural and food trade. An analysis in the input markets can be more complex 
considering the vertical market linkages between input and output markets. As a 
second step, I outline a strategy for choosing the appropriate method to quantify the 
effects of NTMs. In addition, a specific example of an input restriction imposed by the 
EU is analyzed to demonstrate the quantification of a real world NTM.   
4.2 Review of Methodologies Used to Assess NTMs 
4.2.1 Classification of NTMs 
Korinek, Melatos, and Rau (2008) have classified NTMs by the type of policy 
instrument, scope of the barrier, regulatory target, legal discipline, type of market 
restriction, product category, and geographical region. Such a classification helps to 
identify differences in NTMs in agricultural and food trade among countries that could 
have a tendency to protect their domestic markets. To simplify or generalize these 
classifications, all NTMs can be analyzed based on the policy magnitude and the 
policy design.  
The magnitude or degree of a NTM measures the stringency of the measure. For 
example, a policy magnitude can be as strict as an import ban (prohibitive), or it can 
be less strict through the use of Maximal Residue Levels (MRLs) based on the Codex1 
standard. The policy design of a NTM includes two components: 1) where the NTMs 
are imposed (e.g. on the input used to produce a product or on the final product 
content directly) and; 2) how the NTMs are implemented. For two examples: in terms 
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of the geographical scope, the discriminatory or non- discriminatory NTMs are 
applied to domestic or/and foreign producers. In terms of product scope, he 
discriminatory or non- discriminatory NTMs are to all types of products or to a 
specific type of product when there is product differentiation in the market. Methods 
of quantifying NTMs will be analyzed based on above two classifications. 
4.2.2 Price Wedge 
The NTMs create a price “wedge” between the domestic price of the traded product 
in the importing country and the world price of the product. As mentioned before all 
NTMs can be categorized into two general types based on the policy magnitude (level 
of stringency), either stopping trade flows completely (prohibitive) or raising the 
transactions costs to reduce trade flows. In both cases, the price wedge exists. A direct 
way to measure the impact of the NTMs then is simply to calculate this price wedge 
(Korinek, Melators and Rau 2008; Beghin and Xiong 2016).  
The key for the price wedge method is to separate other trade impediments from 
the NTMs in the process of calculation. There are many other factors that may also 
lead to a higher importing price. It is difficult to clearly distinguish the impact from 
the NTMs to other “distractions” such as transport costs, distribution costs, and 
perceived quality differences. Once these “distraction” factors are identified, it may be 
possible to determine the “equivalent” (ad valorem or specific) tariff rate that induces 
both the restricted import level and the higher domestic price induced by NTMs 
(Korinek, Melators and Rau 2008).  
Another key assumption for the price wedge method is perfect substitution, or the 
homogenous products assumption which requests that the domestic and the imported 
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products are perfect substitute. This assumption is especially difficult to hold in 
markets with standards such as agricultural and food markets with numerous food 
safety standards. Producers not only select the quantity to produce but also the quality. 
In addition, agricultural and food markets often include highly differentiated products 
(for example, food can be differentiated by production location, by variety, by size, by 
color, by harvesting time and so on) and calculating tariff equivalents for NTMs with 
the price wedge method may therefore be difficult. When firms can select both the 
quantity and quality of output (Alchian and Allen 1964; Hummels and Skiba 2004), 
there may not be a tariff equivalence for every quota and the price wedge method may 
fail.  
Despite the difficulty, the price wedge method has been most often applied in 
analysis of agricultural and food trade. Krissoff, Calvin, and Gray (1997) used time 
series data to estimate the tariff rate equivalents of: SPS standards to prevent fire 
blight, codling moth, apple maggot, and other pests imposed by Japan, South Korea, 
and Mexico on U.S. apple exports. Meanwhile they compared the effects of removing 
tariff rates and removing NTMs with the estimated tariff rate equivalents. The paper 
showed the tariffs and the NTM barriers substantially decrease global apple trade in 
the examining time period.  
Later, Calvin, and Krissoff (1998) further considered the effects of fire blight on 
transmitted on trade. They quantified the SPS barriers to U.S. apple exports to Japan 
by calculating the tariff equivalent using a partial equilibrium model. They simulated 
the trade and welfare results of eliminating the SPS and the tariffs when there is no 
transmission of the disease and when there is the transmission of the disease through 
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international trade. They found that the NTMs and tariff barriers have much larger 
effects particularly on the U.S. apple trade than on other countries, with a short run 
effect at about 9% reduction in U.S. apple trade and a long run effect at about 35% 
reduction of U.S. apple trade.     
Relaxation of the homogeneous product assumption is commonly used in studies 
that examine the effects of NTMs. Yue, Beghin, and Jensen (2005) derived a 
revamped tariff equivalent estimate of NTMs. In addition, they accounted for the large 
and costly border effects from transportation, linguistic differences, poor infrastructure 
and law enforcement. Specifically, they identified tariffs, quality differences, and 
marketing costs as three other possible reasons a price wedge between the domestic 
and foreign prices. They then developed a methodology to distribute the observed 
price gap back to these four sources. A partial equilibrium model was defined and 
simulated with apples differentiated as either domestically produced or imported. Yue, 
Beghin, and Jensen (2005) calculated the tariff equivalent for the SPS requirements for 
the U.S. apples. For different degrees of domestic preference and for different values 
for the elasticity of substitution, they found that removing the Japanese NTMs would 
actually generate limited export gains to the United States.  
A limitation of the price wedge method is that it cannot be used when the 
magnitude of NTMs is very high and when the NTMs create prohibitive trade barriers, 
such as a policy ban. When there are no bilateral trade flows observed, there will not 
be a price difference to create a tariff equivalent. Yue and Beghin (2009) have solved 
this problem by using Wales and Woodland (1983)’s Kuhn-Tucker approach to 
estimate corner solutions in the consumer choice set. They derived a random utility 
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model and used it to calculate the tariff equivalent of prohibitive NTMs imposed by 
Australia on New Zealand apple exports. By estimating the forgone apple trade 
between the two countries they found that the Australian NTMs have significantly 
decreased trade and created welfare losses of about 50million U.S. dollar for Australia.  
Based on the above description and from examples in the literature, I summarize 
the price wedge method with the following properties: 1) to measure the magnitude 
(level of stringency) of NTMs, the price wedge method can be used to analyze a wide 
range of NTMs from the prohibitive (a ban) to less strict levels with different models 
and assumptions; 2) to measure the design (on what and how) of NTMs, it works for 
homogeneous products as well as heterogeneous products. The method can be used for 
NTMs imposed on inputs or outputs of the traded products; 3) the method is often 
used as a first step in a general equilibrium or partial equilibrium model to simulate 
market changes in price and quantity and to calculate welfare changes. It also 
facilitates the use of the gravity model method as it provides the tariff equivalent 
variable for that regression analysis. 
4.2.3 Gravity Model 
As one of the most commonly used methods in international trade economics, the 
gravity model has been often used to assess various issues in trade (Xiong and Beghin 
2013a), such as distance, common borders and language, fixed trade cost between 
countries (Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein 2008), as well as NTMs (Maskus and 
Wilson 2001). Gravity models typically use panel or cross-section data to regress 
bilateral trade values (exports or imports) on the above mentioned factors that are 
interpreted as explanatory variables. These coefficients provides a quantification of the 
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impact of the NTMs on trade (Korinek, Melators and Rau 2008).  
To better measure various NTMs, the gravity model is a flexible method that can 
accommodate a number of different approaches. A NTM can be measured according 
to it design of being either input-oriented or output- oriented (van Beers and van den 
Bergh 1997). The input-oriented measures quantify the factor inputs involved in 
meeting a given standard such as investments in pollution abatement and control, or 
public expenditure on research and development. The output-oriented measures, on 
the other hand, quantify the direct impact of the standard or regulation on the products 
themselves.  
To measure the magnitude of NTMs, some research has used the gravity model to 
incorporate frequency and coverage measures. Gravity model analyses that use 
frequency and coverage measures of standards usually cover a wide range of products 
that are subject to NTMs. Estimation results concentrate on the direction of the trade 
impact, that is, whether standards are trade-restricting or trade-promoting. Some 
regress explicit standards and requirements such as MRLs directly into the model. 
Specific examples will be shown below in the discussion, as well as limitations of this 
extension of gravity modeling.  
The analysis using gravity model is often subject to heteroscedasticity problems 
due to the “multilateral resistance term” that is omitted in the equation specification 
(Xiong and Behgin 2013b). Previous studies have examined heteroscedasticity in such 
applications (Anderson and van Wincoop 2003; Baldwin and Taglioni 2006; Silva and 
Tenreyro 2009) and have adopted various techniques properly to estimate the gravity 
equation (Silva and Tenreyro 2006; Martin and Pham 2008).  
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Munasib and Roy (2013) addressed structural issues and heteroscedasticity by 
introducing a new measure called the bridge to cross (BTC), which considers the 
regulatory gap between the exporting and importing countries for a particular NTM. 
Because the BTC effect varies over time by the trading partners, it is able to account 
for unobserved heterogeneity (multilateral resistance) in empirical trade models and in 
reduced form gravity models. As for application, Munasib and Roy (2013) used a 
specific SPS regulation example, the aflatoxin contamination in maize. The results 
showed that the BTC effect is higher for the less developed countries, which provided 
policy implications about market access for those countries.  
Another point that generates concern with the gravity model specification is 
endogeneity. In theory, instrumental variable estimation can be used to mitigate 
endogeneity, however it may be difficult to find the suitable instruments (variables 
which explain the existence of the policy variable yet do not influence bilateral trade). 
Xiong and Beghin (2013b) addressed potential endogeneity by separating the NTM’s 
impact on the import demand for the trading partners’ supply of the products. As an 
empirical test Xiong and Beghin (2013b) used the example of high-income OECD 
countries importing plant products. The OECD countries set the MRL for the pesticide 
and antibiotic residues on the plant products. Xiong and Beghin (2013b) emphasized 
the fact that the same NTMs affect different trading partners in different ways. For an 
exporting county that already had similar MRLs as compared to other OECD 
countries, its exports to the market with a new MRL policy would be less affected 
when compared to other exporting countries. The results showed that the new MRL 
enhances the import demand and could hinder foreign exporters’ supply. Moreover, 
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exporters from less and least developed countries are more constrained by the MRL 
than those from developed countries.  
The gravity model is summarized here comparing to the price wedge method. 
Similar to the price wedge method, the gravity model can also be used to measure 
different magnitude (level of stringency) of NTMs from the most prohibitive to less 
strict level. Compared to the price wedge method, the gravity model has less 
flexibility. There are two ways to measure the stringency of the NTMs, using the 
frequency and coverage measures of standards and using explicit standards 
requirements such as the MRL. In terms of measuring the design (on what and how) of 
NTMs, the gravity model approach works for NTMs imposed either on input or output 
markets. Compared to the price wedge method, it may work better for homogeneous 
products. When studying the heterogeneity products, the endogeneity issue can be 
taken care by separating different impacts on NTMs on products. In addition, the 
gravity model has been widely used especially in environment relevant policy 
analysis. It is focused on trade flow/volume estimation in terms of quantifying the 
effects of NTMs. In recent literature, the gravity model is also applied to price and 
welfare analysis when sufficient data is available (Disdier and Marette 2010). 
4.2.4 Cost-Benefit Accounting 
To measure the trade effects of NTMs, it is not only important to calculate the 
actual trade costs, but also to measure indirect costs associated with trade for both 
exporting and importing countries. The cost-benefit accounting method is designed to 
incorporate demand supply shocks that arise from the implementation of the NTMs. 
These shocks are especially important in conducting welfare analysis.  
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Increasing level of international trade have brought additional external effects (Van 
Tongeren, Beghin and Marette 2009) such as NTMs influenced production decisions, 
improved product quality, reduced asymmetric information, and changes in consumer 
demand. To become compliant with NTM standards, there will be additional 
production costs for firms (for example, labelling, testing, and obtaining certification). 
In addition, firms may have to adopt new production techniques for environmental or 
health or safety reasons. Standards can also change input requirements; for example, 
firms may need to add new machines to comply with regulations and this may affect 
the use of other inputs.  
On the other hand, being compliant to NTM standards also bring benefits. It may 
reduce a firm’s marginal cost of production by encouraging the firm to upgrade its 
facilities. There can also be the first mover advantage for firms entering new markets 
with specific NTMs. Consumer demand can also be altered as firms comply with 
NTMs. For example, when a NTM standard is implemented to enhance product 
quality, consumers should be willing to consume more products once the products 
meet a higher standard. Consumers may gain utility from the better quality (compliant) 
products and will be willing to pay higher prices for these products.  
From another prospective, the cost-benefit accounting approach is able to assess the 
economic impact of market failures. There are three general market failures. First for 
consumers due to imperfection information and product quality concerns; second for 
producers due to output and input problems; third for society due to environmental and 
eco-system issues (Van Tongeren, Beghin and Marette 2009). 
The cost-benefit accounting framework essentially employs a partial equilibrium 
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model, with demand and supply relationships that can be calibrated to empirical data 
and therefore allows for the calculation of economic welfare effects. Usually, the 
demand side is modeled as a utility maximization problem and the supply side is 
modeled as a profit maximization problem. Specific utility and production functional 
forms can be structured according to specific NTM cases. In the simple case, a 
reduced functional form can be used with an exogenous parameter included in 
either/both demand and supply side to capture market shocks.  
Peterson and Orden (2008) illustrated two characteristics of the cost-benefit 
framework with an example of Mexican avocado exports to the United States subject 
to SPS standards. They showed how the cost-benefit framework model is able to 
evaluate complicated changes in NTM standards and how it can be used to measure 
welfare changes, for both importing and exporting countries (Korinek, Melators and 
Rau 2008; Petterson and Orden 2008). Using a partial equilibrium model, the authors 
measured the welfare impact for both consumers and producers from both importing 
and exporting countries under three possible policy scenarios. They found that 
removing the remaining compliance measures would reduce the net welfare gain, so 
the results depend on specific measures and the estimated probabilities of pest 
infestations.  
Another example is from Liu and Yue (2009). They first quantified the combined 
effects of SPS measures and customs and administrative procedures (two major 
NTMs) and followed the cost-benefit accounting framework to estimate the effects of 
these two NTMs in the Japanese cut flower market. They used specific function forms 
to model the consumer preference and production, paying special attention to 
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incorporate the quality changes that occur for highly perishable agricultural products. 
The results that the two major NTMs had limited Japanese cut flower imports.   
Van Tongeren, Beghin and Marette (2009) applied the cost-benefit accounting 
framework and provided both a theoretical and empirical illustration. The empirical 
example showed that the cost-benefit accounting method can be used to model 
markets with differentiated products. The research assessed the impact of mandatory 
labelling in the case of fish consumption in France (Matette et al. 2008). It evaluated 
the impact that a label providing health information had on consumer choice. There 
were two types of fish that consumers in France could choose from, a relatively 
“risky” type of fish and a type of fish that is not only “less risky” but also offers some 
health benefits. Fish exporters in the Ivory Coast and Seychelles faced a declining 
demand after the labeling scheme was implemented in France. Experimental data on 
the value of the information was collected for the simulation. Other key parameters in 
the model were either calculated or obtained from industry sources. They found that 
there was a positive net welfare gain from informing households at risk though some 
losses for the high risk fish producers and for consumers not concerned by the 
revealed information. The model successfully captured different consumers’ 
(concerned and non-concerned about the health information provided on the label) 
responses to the labeling, and how different fish producers lost or gained from 
labeling. Among producers, the no risk and healthy information provided fish 
producers’ welfare gain outweighed the loss of the risk fish producers.   
Comparing to the price wedge and gravity model methods, the cost-benefit 
accounting method may be the easiest one to capture different levels of NTMs by 
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calibrating parameters in the model set up. The prohibitive regulation such as an 
import ban can be easily analyzed as the autarky situation. Fewer assumptions are 
needed compared to the gravity model method. Similar to the price wedge and gravity 
model methods, the cost-benefit accounting method is able to measure the NTMs on 
homogeneous products and heterogeneous products, as well as NTMs imposed either 
on input or output markets for the traded products. The variations can be modeled as 
part of the utility and production functions. It can also be used together with the other 
two methods (Disdier and Marette 2010). With calculation or estimation results from 
the other two methods, the cost-benefit accounting method can be used to calculate the 
welfare of the NTM impacts. Another feature of the method is that in addition to 
historical trade data, the method is also able to use experimental data collected from 
laboratory or field research.  
4.2.5 Summary of Methodologies 
In section 2, I discussed three popular methods to quantify the impact of NTMs on 
trade and welfare. The three methods are evaluated based on their abilities to quantify 
the magnitude of a NTM and to assess the design of a NTM effect. Table 4.1 is a brief 
summary of these methods. All three methods can be used to measure different level 
of stridency of NTMs. The cost-benefit accounting method requires less assumption or 
modeling techniques. All the three methods are able to study the NTMs impact on 
input and output, on homogenous and heterogamous products. The gravity model 
method may requires most assumption in this case. The requirement for the data used 
in the gravity model can also be challenging. The price wedge method is the most 
direct way to quantify the actual cost involved in implementing NTMs and it is always 
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used in conjunction with other methods to estimate trade flow and welfare effects. The 
gravity model method relates the degree of regulation to the value of bilateral trade 
between countries or to an individual firm’s export decision. The frequency measure 
or coverage measure of a given standard determines the degree of regulation (Korinek, 
Melators and Rau 2008). The cost-benefit accounting method explicitly models how 
producers and consumers response to price changes induced by implementing or 
eliminating the NTMs.  
Table 4.1. Summary of the Three Methods 
Methods Magnitude Design Others 
  Object How  
Price wedge Y output Y Always combined with 
other methods 
Gravity model Y Y Y Trade flow estimation 
Cost-benefit 
accounting framework 
Y Y Y Can be used with other 
methods; focusing on 
welfare measures 
 
Although the three methods discussed in the paper are widely used by agricultural 
economists studying the effects of NTMs, there are limitations their application to 
estimation and simulation approaches. For the simulation model, the results depend on 
the specifications of utility and production, and the selection of parameters. The 
reduced-form econometric models of bilateral trade may have problems such as 
missing variables and incorrect functional forms. Therefore, sensitivity analysis is 
necessary when using the simulation methods.  
Despite the limitations, these methods are still able to conduct reasonable impact 
analysis of NTMs on trade and welfare and to provide policy implications that are 
useful for trade negotiations. It is important to understand the mechanism of these 
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methods so as to 1) choose the appropriate one to conduct research 2) to improve the 
current methods and to develop new methods to quantify the impact of NTMs. For 
policy makers and economists to determine which method is the most suitable, three 
issues need to be considered: 1) does the NTM tend to have significant impact on 
trade/ welfare? Answering this question requires reasonable predictions based on 
actual evidence and experience in the field; 2) what are the magnitude (prohibitive or 
not) and design (on input or output) of the NTM; 3) what are the characteristics of the 
products subject to the NTM? For example, highly differentiated or not? In the 
following section, I will provide a real example to taking these three issues into 
consideration to determine the most suitable method.  
4.3 Empirical Application 
Following the above analysis on how to choose an appropriate method to quantify 
the effects of a NTM, I will use an example in this section. A chemical, 
diphenhydramine (DPA) that is applied to apples during the postharvest storage may 
have negative impacts on human health. Due to this concern, the EU lowered the MRL 
of DPA on apples to a rate that is 50 times smaller than what is allowed in other major 
apple consuming countries in March 2014.  
To quantify the effect of the new MRL regulation, an appropriate method should be 
chosen. First, it is likely that this particular NTM will cause a significant impact to EU 
apple trade as the EU is one of the largest apple importing region in the world. The 
MRL change will bring changes in welfares for major trading partners who export 
apples to the EU market. Moreover, the EU consumer and producer welfare will also 
change when it is being “protected” by the new MRL.  
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Second, the magnitude (prohibitive or not) and design (on input or output) of the 
NTM is critical to understand. This specific drop is prohibitive, 50 times lower than 
the Codex standard which is widely followed by most apple producing countries. The 
reduction in the MRL can be considered as a ban of the particular chemical to some 
extent as the new MRL is too low to even allow cross-contamination. Storage, 
packaging, and transportation facilities that are used for apples processed with DPAs 
could cause the problem of exceeding the new MRL even after stop using DPAs to 
future production. This huge reduction is expected to be met for both EU domestic 
apple producers as well as apple exporters. Hence the NTM is introduced with no 
discrimination. There is no difference between the EU home produced apples and the 
imported apples. This MRL drop affects a particular input in apple production;  
Third, it is important to assess the characteristics of the products subject to the 
NTM. Apples are a highly differentiated agricultural category. There are many 
varieties of apples that differ in taste and appearance. Also, the NTM has the capacity 
to lead to quality improvements for products that are compliant with the standard.  
Taking all these issues into consideration, the cost-benefit accounting method 
appears to be the most suitable method to adopt for quantifying the EU MRL 
reduction. The price wedge method is not sufficient to capture the trade flow changes 
and welfare changes and would need to be combined with another method in order to 
address the third issue of assessing product characteristics. Both the gravity model and 
the cost-benefit accounting method are able to address the second and third issues 
listed above. However, the cost-benefit accounting method focuses on welfare analysis 
and this is a priority in this case. In addition, there are limited trade data given that the 
 118 
NTM was recently implemented which may add difficulties when using the gravity 
model. In the following section, the specific modeling approach will be shown and 
described further. 
4.3.1 A Model to Study the Effects of a DPA Ban for EU Apple Imports 
To model the effect of a NTM, the appropriate product analysis is important.  
With apples there are many different varieties. Some varieties of apples suffer severely 
from specific postharvest disorders while others do not, and those apples that are 
susceptible to postharvest disorders are treated with DPA when stored. The MRL 
reduction concerning the use of DPA is a NTM that only targets certain apple 
varieties. While other varieties of apples are not directly affected by the NTM. My 
model will highlight this product differentiation by assuming different varieties of 
apples are imperfect substitutes. The nutrition content may not vary too much but 
other factors such as taste, fragrance, and textures that are directly related to 
consumers’ preference as highly differentiated. In addition, the new MRL is applied to 
both the European apple producers and foreign apple producers without 
discrimination. Therefore, for the same variety of apples, the domestic produced 
apples (assuming there are the same varieties produced in the EU) and the imported 
apples are perfect substitutes for one another.  
The NTM created by decreasing the MRL on stored apples can be conceptualized 
as a negative shock on supply, specifically on the storage input used in apple 
production. The new MRL requirement will increase production costs because 
producers need to make effort to become compliant to the new MRL standard. The 
MRL for the DPA imposed by the EU is the lowest in the world; it is 50 times lower 
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than the previous Codex standard the EU and other major apple producing countries 
used (Calvo 2010). This implies that the effort level required to become compliant to 
the new MRL is significant.  
For producers, it is expected that producers in the EU and elsewhere will become 
compliant to the MRL so as not to give up the EU market. Non-EU apple producers 
may have more flexibility because it is easier for them to switch to other export 
markets, however entering new markets elsewhere can also be costly. The EU apple 
producers will have to become compliant to the NTM despite the increase in 
production costs.  
Although apples are highly differentiated products, different varieties of apples 
may not be perfect substitutes for each other. The reduction in the most affected 
varieties from the EU may result in an increase in supply of other varieties of apples 
that are not much affected by the NTM. These less-affected apples require less storage 
input in their production. So the NTM won’t increase their production cost as much as 
the apple varieties that requires more DPA in postharvest storage. It is expected that 
both EU production and EU imports of these less affected apples will increase and 
these producers may enjoy a welfare gain.    
The NTM will increase consumers’ surplus by improving apple quality as this 
particular NTM is a MRL reduction in a chemical that could potentially threaten 
human health. Therefore apples that are compliant to the NTM are considered to have 
better “quality” in the EU market. In addition to the quality improvement, there will be 
consumer surplus change due to a reduction in the supply of the affected apples and an 
increase in the supply of the apple not affected by the MRL. The overall EU consumer 
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surplus is expected to be positive in the long run under the new NTM. 
Based on the above analysis on the NTM, for apples imported into the EU, a partial 
equilibrium model is developed to examine the NTM and to understand the likely 
effect on production, consumption, and international markets. To model the consumer 
demand, apples are considered to be heterogeneous by varieties. For simplicity, 
assuming the EU is importing all N varieties of apples, denoted by i, i={1,…, N} from 
foreign countries and producing them domestically. These apples are categorized into 
four groups: domestic produced apples susceptible/non-susceptible to postharvest 
disorders (such as Gala/ Honey Crisp and Granny Smith), imported susceptible/non-
susceptible to postharvest disorders (such as Gala/ Honey Crisp and Granny Smith). 
To focus on quantifying the NTM of dropping the MRL on DPA, tariffs are not 
included in the model.   
On the supply side, there are M inputs, denoted by k, k ={1,…, M}, that are 
commonly used in the production of all domestic produced varieties. The model 
includes two main types of inputs: farm input (storage input) and marketing input. The 
input ratios used in apple production vary across different varieties of apples. For 
example, the apples susceptible to postharvest disorders require more storage input 
and thus have a bigger input ratio of the storage input compared to the varieties that 
are non-susceptible to postharvest disorders. The production inputs are assumed to not 
be non-tradable and for simplicity, fixed input proportions are assumed here. The 
particular NTM set up by the EU will affect the storage input in the apple production. 
The production cost of the apples susceptible to postharvest disorders will increase 
relatively more than the non-susceptible because the susceptible apples have a bigger 
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cost share for the storage input.  
To focus on the EU apple trade, the model is simplified to include only two 
regions: the EU and the – rest of world (ROW) apple producers. In the model, the EU 
is considered to be a net apple importer and the ROW is considered to be a net apple 
exporter. Apple trade among the countries in the ROW region is viewed as intra-
regional trade and will not be captured in the model. Therefore, the model is set up to 
only study the apple trade between the EU and the ROW. In addition, the model also 
considers input market to analyze the NTM imposed on the particular storage input 
(the farm input). The model is able to address the effect of a NTM imposed directly on 
the output market, especially in the case of product differentiation in the output 
market.    
Following the cost-benefit framework, a partial equilibrium model with the features 
described above is set up as following: 
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There are eight equations with eight unknown variables in the model. Equation (1) is 
the output demand, where i
yQD is the domestic demand of output i in region y, where
{ }EU, ROWy∈ . The price vector P is p={p1, …, pN}. It is the same for both 
domestic produced and foreign produced apples. The vector of exogenous variables is 
denoted by Vy which includes policy changes such as government mandate and 
changes of consumers’ preferences. Equation (2) is region y’s demand for the 
imported crop i; i
yQM is the import demand function with a vector of exogenous 
variables Zy. This equation is only for the EU that has import demand for apples 
Equation (3) is the export demand function of apples. Vector yR is the vector of 
exogenous variables including factors that affect the exports demand such as existence 
of free trade agreement, natural disasters in the importing countries, transportation 
costs and so on. Equation (4) is the output market clearing condition and i
yQS is the 
total supply of output i in region y. Equation (5) shows the competitive equilibrium 
and i
yTC is the total cost function of output i in region y. The equation shows the 
market clearing condition for domestic produced product i where marginal cost equals 
domestic price. The derived input k in region y is shown in equation (6), where 
k
yW is 
the price of input k is in region y. Equation (7) is the input k supply function in region 
y. The vector Uy denotes a set of exogenous variables that affect supply in region y. 
Here both foreign and domestic apple producers are subject to the new NTM created 
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by the lower MRL of DPA on apples. Equation (8) is the input market clearing 
condition in region y.  
Total differentiating equation (1) to (8) yields the following linear elasticity model. 
Here ijyη is the demand elasticity of output i with respect to the price of output j of 
region y. Similarly, import demand elasticity is ymijη  and the export demand elasticity 
is yxijη  in region y. Parameter ,
y
i kγ is the cost share of input k in the production of 
output i in region y. Its summation over input k equal to 1. Parameter ,
y
i klσ  is the 
Allen elasticity of substitution between input k and l used in the production of output i 
in region y. In Equation (7’), variable kε  is the elasticity of supply of input k in 
region y. In the last equation, the industry share of input k in the production of output i 
in region y is denoted as ikλ . After specifying the key parameters in the above system, 
the model will be able to capture the changes in apple trade flows. With the simulated 
changes in output price, output production quantity and export quantity, welfare 
changes of apple consumer and producer due to the NTM imposed by the EU on apple 
production input can also be calculated.   
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4.3.2 Parameterization  
Parameterization of the model is done by selecting and aggregating data across 
apple varieties and trading countries. Since apples are a highly differentiated product, I 
have categorized the data based on two features: the postharvest disorder property and 
the place of origination.  
According to the European Commission Agricultural and Rural Development 
(2011), the EU imports mainly apple varieties that are mid-sized and have sour and 
sweet flavor based on the preferences of the European consumers. The most popular 
EU produced and imported apple varieties are Gala, Honey Crisp, and Granny Smith. 
Among them, the varieties that suffer most from postharvest disorders are Honey 
Crisp and Granny Smith. The varieties that is non-susceptible to postharvest disorders 
is Gala, which is not much affected by the new NTM. In the model, I have aggregated 
the information of Granny Smith and Honey Crisp apples to describe the properties for 
their varieties that are susceptible to postharvest disorder varieties and use the Gala 
information to describe the varieties that are non- susceptible to postharvest disorders.  
For the ROW producers that export apples to the EU, I have identified Chile, New 
Zealand, South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina from the Southern Hemisphere and the 
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United States, China, and Canada from the North Hemisphere (European Commission 
2011) as representative countries. These countries are the major apple exporting 
countries to the EU markets and I aggregated trade flow patterns from these countries 
to describe ROW apple producers.   
A consistent demand specification, including all of the exogenous variables, would 
require the various adding up properties implied by production differentiation and the 
budget constraint to hold. However, given the model is partial equilibrium in nature, 
the aggregate income and prices of products outside of the apple sector would remain 
constant throughout the adjustment process. The own price elasticities for output 
apples were obtained from the SWOPSIM database developed by the Economic 
Research Service of the US Department of Agriculture (USDA SWOPSIM). 
Combining with studies of Lechene (2000) and Cerda et al. (2004), I have obtained the 
overall demand elasticity for apple in the EU and in the ROW region as -0.26 and -
0.41. Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2008) estimated the import demand elasticities for a 
large set of countries at a disaggregated level of product detail. The estimated import 
demand elasticities for the EU is about -0.1 for apple. The cross-price elasticities for 
different varieties of apples are obtained from Richards and Patterson (1998) and 
aggregated based on European market share for the non-susceptible and susceptible 
varieties as 0.35. For both categories of apples, I assume that domestic produced and 
imported apples are perfect substitution for each other. For the foreign apple 
producers, there is no reliable estimates in the literature to describe the export demand 
elasticity for foreign markets. I set the export demand elasticity as -1.5 given it is 
relatively more elastic for the foreign producers following Stone (1979) and Reimer, 
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Zheng and Gehlhar (2012). Using these elasticity parameters (demand, import 
demand, and export demand), I used the Armington specification with market shares 
of different varieties of apples in the EU domestic apple market and the EU import 
apple market to calculate the elasticities of the susceptible and non-susceptible 
varieties2. Following previous estimated supply elasticities in the literature (Nerlove 
and Addison 1958; Gardner 1979), I set the baseline supply elasticity parameter for 
apples equal to 0.5 for both the EU and the foreign apple producers, assuming that the 
supply of fruit is relatively inelastic. Since apples are perennial crops, all cross-price 
elasticities of supply are set to equal to zero (Rickard and Lei 2011).  
These elasticity values that were obtained from empirical studies are used as the 
baseline value of elasticities. Later, a Monte Carlo simulation is adopted to conduct a 
sensitivity analysis across a range of parameters. Therefore, I set the baseline 
parameters as the central tendency and specified a variance of 0.04 to develop beta 
(3,3) distributions (Brester, Marsh and Atwood 2004). The distributions are selected to 
ensure negative demand elasticities and positive supply elasticities in the analysis. The 
beta distribution is often used to model events that are constrained to an interval 
between a minimum and maximum value.  
I have calculated cost and industry shares for European domestic producers based 
on European Commission data. For the ROW region, I follow Sumner, Lee and 
Hallstrom (1999) and the USDA-ERS “20%:80%” marketing margin3. All the price 
and quantity data for apples are obtained from the European Commission 
(EUROSTAT) and USDA Foreign Agricultural Service’s report on apple and pear 
production in 2011. These initial price and quantity values are also used for the 
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calculation of welfare changes.  
The exogenous shock brought by the NTM is imposed on equation (7’). As 
mentioned before, the new MRL of DPA on apples increases the production cost, 
especially for the susceptible varieties of apples which require more DPA in the 
storage stage. According to the industry information (USAEC 2013), it is difficult to 
estimate how much the NTM could increase production costs. Because the new MRL 
is so low, apples can also be contaminated by the DPA in packing, shipping, and in 
other stages in addition to the storage stage of the apple production, as long as the 
apple producers continue using their old facilitates. To become compliant to the new 
MRL, not only do producers need to update storage techniques and equipment, but 
also they need improvement in the storage stage and also they need investment in 
other stages and therefore the strictness of the NTM has made it complex to calculate 
the increased cost for apples producers. However, what can be certain is that the strict 
MRL will increase production cost and is considered to be prohibitive for some small 
apple producers with limited capacities. Therefore, in the model, I simply assume a 
plausible range of increases in storage input costs for apple production between 25% 
and 35%. This plausible range is based on the production cost case study of the EU 
apple in 2011.   
4.3.3 Results 
Results from the partial equilibrium model are reported in Table 4.2. The three 
columns show the results when production costs increased by 25%, 30%, and 35% 
respectively. The first two rows show the price changes for the susceptible and non-
susceptible apple varieties. Because of the MRL reduction of the DPA, the storage 
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input cost increases. Therefore the price of apple varieties that are intensively using 
this input also increase. The results show that the price of susceptible apples would 
increase by 2.01%, 2.04% and 2.23% with different increases in the cost of the farm 
input. However, the increases in the storage input production cost do not affect the 
production of the susceptible variety of apples in a significant way. The slight price 
decreases may be due to the substitution effects between different varieties of apples, 
increasing supply of the other variety, or more abundant supply of the other input due 
to the decreasing production of the other varieties of apples. 
As for the apple imports into the EU, there is approximately a 15% decrease in EU 
imports of susceptible apples from the ROW suppliers. Some of these export 
reductions may be temporary yet some of them may be permanent because some 
foreign producers may give up exporting the susceptible varieties due to the new 
NTM. However, the foreign apple producers meanwhile increase their exports of the 
non-susceptible varieties to the EU. There is an obvious substitution effect between 
the susceptible and non-susceptible apples. The EU imports more non-susceptible 
apples to its market, to “make up” for loss in exports of the susceptible apples. In all 
the three scenarios, there is a 10% increase in the EU imports of non-susceptible apple 
varieties.  
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Table 4.2. Economic Effects of Reducing MRL of DAP on Apples in the EU 
 Increasing farm 
input cost by 25% 
Increasing farm 
input cost by 30% 
Increasing farm 
input cost by 35% 
Price Changes (unit %) 
Susceptible variety 2.01  
(1.8, 2.05) 
2.04  
(2.0, 2.1) 
2.23  
(2.2, 2.6) 
Non-susceptible variety -0.16  
(-0.18, -0.1) 
-0.16  
(-0.2, -0.06) 
-0.18  
(-0.19, -0.16) 
Quantity Changes (unit %) 
EU imported susceptible 
variety  
-13.86  
(-13.98, -12.11) 
-15.19 
(-15.80, -13.99) 
-16.01 
(-16.82, -15.82) 
EU imported non-
susceptible variety 
7.95 
(7.22, 8.01) 
9.98 
(8.76, 10.10) 
10.56 
(9.53, 11.00) 
EU produced susceptible 
variety 
-3.02 
(-3.67, -2.96) 
-3.95 
(-4.32, -3.63) 
-4.24 
(-4.89, -3.90) 
EU produced non-
susceptible variety 
13.23 
(12.08, 14.21) 
15.68 
(15.60, 16.12) 
17.99 
(16.34, 18.32) 
Surplus Changes (unit million USD in 2011) 
Foreign producers of 
susceptible variety 
-0.81 
(-0.86, -0.78) 
-0.98 
(-0.98, -0.96) 
-1.08 
(-1.12, -0.99) 
Foreign producers of 
non-susceptible variety 
0.88 
(0.83, 0.93) 
1.00 
(0.96, 1.26) 
1.02 
(0.95, 1.10) 
Net producer surplus 
changes 
0.07 
(-0.03, 0.15) 
0.02 
(-0.02, 0.3 ) 
-0.06 
(-0.26, 0.11 ) 
EU producers of 
susceptible variety 
-0.09 
(-0.11, -0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01, 0.06) 
0.01 
(0.008, 0.05) 
EU producers of non- 
susceptible variety 
0.32 
(0.30, 0.42) 
0.33 
(0.31, 0.42) 
0.35 
(0.29, 0.36) 
Net producer surplus 
changes  
0.23 
(0.19, 0.40) 
0.34 
(0.32, 0.48) 
0.36 
(0.298, 0.41) 
Consumers of susceptible 
variety 
-0.92 
(-1.02, -0.92) 
-1.08 
(-1.3, -1.06) 
-1.21 
(-1.40, -0.98) 
Consumers of non-
susceptible variety 
0.93 
(0.89, 1.02) 
0.99 
(0.93, 1.04) 
1.04 
(1.01, 1.2) 
Net consumer surplus 
changes 
0.01 
(0.13, 0.1) 
-0.09 
(-0.37, -0.02) 
-0.17 
(0.39, 0,22) 
Note: Mean values are reported with a 95% confidence interval 
 
The same NTM applied to the EU domestic markets also leads to a reduction in 
production of the susceptible varieties of about 4% in three scenarios. This may be due 
to the increasing production cost brought by the NTM. Compared to the reduction of 
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the imports of the susceptible varieties, the relatively smaller reduction of the 
domestic produced apples implies a better response among European apple producers 
to the NTM. Possible reasons for the better response can be: 1) earlier and better 
preparation of the policy changes notice. The particular NTM is implemented as a 
government mandated standard so there has been more local discussion in the EU on 
this issues before the implementation of the NTM; 2) less flexibility in exiting the EU 
apple market. In addition, there is also a larger increase in the supply of the non-
susceptible varieties from the EU domestic apple producers (about 16%) compared to 
the foreign producers. Both the price and demand increases for this variety of apples 
results in the increased production.  
The last nine rows in Table 4.2 show the changes in the producer and consumer 
surplus for both susceptible and non-susceptible apple varieties. I calculated the 
welfare changes for both producers and consumers in the EU and ROW, using 
changes in factor and product prices and quantities in following equations: 
ΔCS =-P QD EP [1+0.5EQD ]       (9)y y y y yi i i i i   
ΔPS =W XS EW [1+0.5EXS ]        (10)y y y y yk k k k k  
As mentioned before, I have obtained apple price and quantity information for both 
the EU and its apple trading partners in the ROW from the EUROSTAT and USDA 
Foreign Agricultural Service’s report on apple and pear production in 2011. The factor 
quantities of the EU and the ROW are calculated based on output quantities following 
the fixed factor assumptions. The factor prices of the farm input and marketing input 
are calculated according to the “20% and 80%” rule based on output prices. Both 
calculations are weighted on market shares. The change in total producer surplus in 
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region y is the sum of the producer surplus from each factor market: y yk
k
ΔPS = (ΔPS )∑  
and the change in the total consumer surplus in region y is the sum of the consumer 
surplus across output markets y yi
i
ΔCS = (ΔCS )∑ . 
Throughout the three scenarios, the foreign producers lose welfare for the 
susceptible varieties but gain for the non-susceptible varieties. In the first two 
scenarios, when the production costs increase by 25% or 30%, the net changes in 
producer surplus are positive. In other words, the gains from the non-susceptible 
varieties outweigh the losses from the susceptible varieties for the producers in the 
ROW region. In the third scenario, the net producer surplus for the ROW region is 
negative. This indicates that the cost increase and the loss of the EU market for the 
non-susceptible varieties lead to an outcome with negative welfare for foreign 
producers under the NTM. The producer surplus changes imply that under the NTM, 
foreign producers may not stop exporting apples to the EU market. By increasing 
exports of non-affected apples and decreasing exports of affected apples, foreign apple 
producers may actually be better off in some circumstances depending on the 
magnitude of the production cost rise.   
As for the EU producers, there are consistent producer surplus losses for producers 
of the susceptible varieties and gains for producers of the non-susceptible varieties in 
all the three scenarios. The net producer surplus changes are also consistently positive 
in all the three scenarios. Because of the better response to the NTM and to the 
domestic policy changes, the EU apple producers overall are not hurt by the NTM but 
are better off  as they become more competitive in the apple market compared to the 
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ROW producers. 
Consumers of the susceptible varieties lose because of higher prices and also due to 
the smaller quantity available in the market. The quality improvement of the apples 
brought by the new MRL doesn’t lead to a large impact; more time is needed for 
consumers to recognize the quality improvements for the susceptible varieties. 
Consumers of the non-susceptible varieties enjoy a welfare gain because more apples 
are available in the market. The net welfare changes for consumers who consume both 
types of apples are positive in the 25% scenario but negative in the other two 
scenarios. The larger loss among the susceptible varieties may be due to the relatively 
higher price and larger market share of this particular type of apples in the EU market.   
The simulation results are consistent in all the price, quantity, and surplus changes 
throughout the three scenarios. Based on the results in Table 4.2, the reduction of the 
MRL for DPA has decreased the imports of the affected varieties of apples from 
foreign countries and also decreased the EU domestic production of these types of 
apples. However, because of the highly differentiated structure of the apple markets, 
trade in apples did not disappear. Instead, the EU imports more other varieties of apple 
to replace the NTM-affected apples. Meanwhile the EU increases its domestic 
production of other varieties of apples. The NTM has changed the composition of 
apple trade flows into the European market and the market shares of different varieties 
of apples in the EU. In addition to the actual market change, the EU apple producers 
enjoy a welfare gain under the NTM. The foreign apple producers also do when they 
experience mostly increases in gain under the NTM. The consumers are expected to 
enjoy a welfare gain in the long run if they value the quality improvements linked to 
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the NTM.  
Above is a specific example of importing country’s policy change on agricultural 
input using the cost-benefit accounting method to quantify the effects of the policy 
NTM. The method here pays special attention to how the NTM is implemented when 
it affects an input market directly. It also incorporates the product differentiation 
character of the particular market. Despite some limitations in the empirical example, 
it has demonstrated clearly the importance of the process for choosing an appropriate 
method to quantify a NTM, analyzing the effects of supply and demand, and finally 
the welfare analysis using the cost-benefit framework. 
4.4 Conclusion  
Motivated by the gaining importance of NTMs in international trade, particularly in 
agricultural and food trade, this paper reviews previous studies that used various 
methodologies of quantifying NTM in agricultural markets. The three most popular 
methods are summarized: the price wedge, the gravity model, and the cost-benefit 
accounting framework. Each method is analyzed according to their characteristics, and 
I provide actual examples from the literature to further demonstrate the details of each 
method.  
A general guideline of how to choose the most appropriate method is then 
summarized and applied to a real-life example using the cost-benefit accounting 
framework. The example follows the core concepts of the cost-benefit analysis 
framework. I build a partial equilibrium model to assess the economic effects of the 
NTM created by the EU. The cost-benefit accounting framework is flexible to model 
specific characteristics of different NTMs and different product markets. It could 
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model explicitly the changes of consumer and producer and also specifically capture 
the product heterogeneity and the input response of the producers’ problem.  
The cost-benefit accounting framework is the most appropriate approach for this 
particular example studied in the paper for the output, namely a NTM affecting the 
input market in a market with product differentiation. However, for policy makers and 
economists to determine which method is the most suitable to quantify the effects of 
NTMs in their specific work, they should carefully consider the characteristics of the 
particular NTM, the related product, and the purpose of the work in order to choose 
the most appropriate method. Again, three issues need to be considered when choosing 
a method: 1) the impact of NTMs on trade/ welfare 2) the magnitude and design of the 
NTMs and 3) the particular characteristics of the products subject to the NTMs. 
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END NOTES 
1 Codex Alimentarius is a joint body of the UN World Health Organization and Food 
Agriculture Organization. Codex MRLs are science-based and considered least trade-
distorting. Most countries follow the Codex recommendations for MRLs. However, 
there are a few exceptions: the United States use MRLs regulated principally by the 
US Environmental Protection Agency with enforcement functions by the US Food and 
Drug Administration, US Department of Agriculture, and state enforcement agencies 
(USEPA, 2013). The EU, Australia, and Japan tend to have MRLs that are much more 
stringent than the Codex MRLs. A few developing countries such as Sri Lanka use 
lenient MRLs (Li and Beghin 2012). 
2 Demand elasticity, import demand elasticity, and export demand elasticity of the 
susceptible varieties are generally more elastic than the non-susceptible varieties. 
3 For every 1 dollar spent in producing an agricultural output, 0.2 is used for farm 
input and 0.8 is used for marketing input (Reed, Elitzak and Wohlgenant 2002).  
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